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En este trabajo estudiamos diferentes dimensiones del fenómeno de la corrupción.
Debido a la dificultad que conlleva estudiar la corrupción, hemos escogido abordar
este tema utilizando principalmente la metodologı́a experimental. En el capı́tulo
dos proponemos un modelo teórico en el cual dos empresas compiten para obtener
la licencia de un proyecto público y un subastador, que actúa como un funcionario
público y representa el poder politico, decide cuál es la empresa ganadora del con-
curso. Los jugadores tipo empresa se enfrentan a un dilema social ya que cuanto
mayor es el soborno ofrecido, mayores serán los beneficios del funcionario y la
probabilidad de que la empresa gane el concurso, pero esto es perjudicial para la
otra empresa y para la sociedad entera. Cuando el espacio de estrategias de las
ofertas de soborno y calidad es discreto, múltiples equilibrios emergen, incluyendo
ofertas más pro-sociales que las predichas en un espacio estratégico continuo.
En el tercer capı́tulo, testamos este modelo en el laboratorio. Obtenemos como
resultado que los sujetos parecen revelar valores intrı́nsecos ya que se desvı́an de
la estrategia que maximiza sus beneficios. También comparamos dos protocolos
de emparejamiento: un emparejamiento fijo durante todo el experimento versus
un emparejamiento aleatorio en cada ronda. Nuestros resultados sugieren que un
1
1. INTRODUCTION
emparejamiento aleatorio disminuye la propensión a sobornar o a ser sobornado
además de que, con el tiempo, aumenta el bienestar social.
En el cuarto capı́tulo, ampliamos el estudio experimental de corrupción añadiendo
nuevos tratamientos al tratamiento base visto en el tercer capı́tulo: primero, la
empresa perdedora tiene la opción de inspeccionar, y segundo, añadimos un jugador
pasivo y observador (lo llamamos “ciudadano”), cuyos beneficios están determina-
dos por la calidad del proyecto ganador. El mecanismo de inspección y castigo,
consiste en que si un soborno es descubierto, ambos agentes corruptos pierden
las ganancias del periodo. Por el contrario, si un soborno no es descubierto, la
empresa denunciadora pierde las ganancias de dicho periodo. Esto convierte la in-
spección en una opción no provechosa para el perdedor y es raramente utilizada,
especialmente hacia el final de la sesión cuando el comportamiento pro-social se
vuelve predominante. Ejecutamos cuatro tratamientos en una única sesión, con 22
grupos independientes que jugaron una versión repetida del juego. Además, en una
sesión previa elicitamos el grado de aversión al riesgo de los sujetos. Encontramos
como resultados principales que la opción de inspección activa significativamente
la motivación extrı́nseca de los sujetos, y el jugador pasivo activa significativa-
mente la motivación intrı́nseca de los sujetos, ambas provocando un descenso de
los sobornos. Además, los jugadores con una alta aversión al riesgo tienden a ofre-
cer mayores sobornos. Por último, el tratamiento con ciudadano parece aumentar
más el bienestar social que el tratamiento con inspección, pero la combinación de
ambos lleva al mayor nivel de bienestar social.
En el capı́tulo cinco estudiamos el comportamiento y la reacción emocional de
los participantes. Replicamos el tratamiento base y el tratamiento con inspección.
La excitación emocional de los sujetos se obtiene a través de las respuestas de
dermo-conductancia. En general, nuestros resultados sugieren que las emociones
más fuertes están asociadas con las desviaciones de la pura maximización mon-
etaria, en lugar de estar asociadas con un un comportamiento (no) ético per se.
Dicho de otro modo, las personas que toman decisiones retando su propio interés
económico sufren una mayor excitación que aquellas que se preocupan únicamente
por su beneficio económico personal. De hecho, utilizando tiempos de respuesta
como medida de la reflexión de los sujetos durante el proceso de toma de de-
cisiones, podemos asociar la respuesta emocional con un conflicto entre motiva-
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ciones primarias o instintivas y emociones secundarias o contemplativas y, más
especı́ficamente, con desviaciones del puro interés monetario de los sujetos. Ob-
servamos que aquellos que sufren mayor excitación presentan mayores tiempos de
respuesta.
1.2 Introduction
This thesis studies corruption from different perspectives. In chapter two we pro-
pose a theoretical model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a
public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political
power, decides the winner of the contest. Firm players face a social dilemma in the
sense that higher bribes increase the officials’ payoff and the bribers’ probability of
obtaining the license, but harm the other firm and society as a whole. The presence
of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilib-
rium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy
space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than
would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.
In the third chapter, we test this model in the laboratory. We obtain that subjects
exhibit pro-social intrinsic values by deviating from the monetary strategy. We also
compare two different matching protocols: a fixed matching over the whole exper-
iment versus random matching in every round. Our results suggest that a random
matching protocol decreases the propensity to engage in bribery, and increases so-
cial welfare after some periods.
In the fourth chapter we report results from an experimental study on corrup-
tion, based on the baseline setting of the third chapter. We add new treatments
to this baseline: an inspection option to the losing firm of the auction and a pass-
ive observer player (‘citizen’), whose benefits are determined by the quality of
the winning project. The inspection and punishment mechanism is such that, if
a bribe is (not) revealed, both corrupt agents (the denouncing bidder) lose(s) this
period’s payoffs. This renders the inspection option unprofitable for the loser and
is rarely used, especially toward the end of the session, when pro-social behavior
becomes pervasive. We conducted 4 treatments in one session where 22 independ-
ent groups played a repeated version of the game, and in a pre-play session, we
3
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elicit subjects’ risk preferences. We found that the extrinsic motivation of people
is activated through the inspection option, and the intrinsic motivation is activated
as well, through the passive receiver yielding to a decrease of bribe offers. In addi-
tion, more risk averse subjects tend to offer higher bribes. In terms of efficiency we
found that groups’ profits are higher due to the effect of the citizen alone than with
just the inspection. The combination of both yields to the highest levels of social
welfare.
In chapter five, we study the behavior and emotional arousal of the participants.
We replicate the baseline and the inspection treatments. Subjects’ emotional arousal
was obtained through skin conductance responses. Generally speaking, our find-
ings suggest that stronger emotions are associated with decisions deviating from
pure monetary reward maximization, rather than with (un)ethical behavior per
se. In fact, using response times as a measure of the subject’s reflection during
the decision-making process, we can associate emotional arousal with the conflict
between primary or instinctive and secondary or contemplative motivations and,







Public procurement auctions are source of potential corrupt exchanges. All over the
world many public projects have been uncovered as resulting from the use of bribes.
Bribery is bilateral, either active or passive. If we focus on the scenario of public
procurement auctions, firms are active bribers as they offer bribes to an auction-
eer, who is considered a passive briber. Despite the countless scandals discovered,
we are still far from knowing the actual volume of bribery in public procurement
because corruption is illegal and secret per se, thus difficult to measure with real
data. According to Transparency International this particular kind of corruption is
harmful as project’s cost can increase more than 50% due to bribe expenses but
it also has a direct implication on the execution of the projects by reducing their
quality. Moreover, according to the World Bank, worldwide bribes are calculated
to be around US$1 trillion (Kaufmann, 2005).
Despite the huge effort exerted and the big contributions to the literature on this
field, any empirical research about corruption and bribery remains a mere approx-
5
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imation from extrapolating some data from, for example, perception surveys1. This
is not surprising due to the difficulty in getting the real amount of bribe as it is un-
covered by definition, therefore, the implicated parts are not interested in revealing
it. However, we cannot omit the big progress that has been made by researchers
in recent years and the reliability of the results obtained. Indeed, all the available
indexes have been very useful to make progress in the investigation of corruption,
concretely in an empirical way. The researches are mainly oriented to understand
how corruption affects development, growth, poverty, and gender equality among
others. From a total of 70 countries, Mauro (1995) demonstrates the negative ef-
fect that corruption may have on growth. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find
evidence that corruption gets lower levels when the public employees’ wages are
high compared to those of the manufacturing sector. Gupta et al. (2002) show that
corruption is positively correlated to poverty in terms of income distribution. Dol-
lar et al. (2001), using a sample of more than 100 countries, give a gender oriented
approach and prove that the higher is the representation of women in the parliament
the lower the level of corruption.
This chapter is addressed to present a theoretical model combining two ele-
ments, bribery and auctions. In particular, our model is oriented to the study of
corruption in public procurement auctions in which firms compete between them
and interact with a public official. In addition to empirical works, a large literat-
ure concerning theoretical models exists. Works as Lien (1986), Beck and Maher
(1986), Büchner et al. (2008), Burguet and Che (2004), Che (1993) have inspired
our model. Although those models reflect mainly the situation where the bidders
take simultaneously decisions on bribes and prices, our model presents rather the
tradeoff between bribe and quality. In particular, our work is based on Büchner
et al. (2008) who propose an auction model where two providers of procurement
compete bidding prices and bribe. Their game displays the kind of corruption that
we personally consider is creating all over the world the highest damages, the one
that involves public procurement auctions. Such a bribery can have fatal effects on
1 Transparency International publishes annually the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which
ranks countries ‘by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and
opinion surveys’. Surveys/assessments are either business people opinion or performance assess-
ments from a group of analysts.
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the quality of public projects or services. In fact, this bribery is hard to denounce
and to demonstrate as far as the political class has the power to control their trans-
parency and the separation of powers is not always as true as desirable.
Hence, we propose a theoretical set up in which we focus on an auction where
two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer
acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of
the contest. This model has the peculiarity of inducing players to engage in bribe
as a monetary maximization behavior. Players as firms face a social dilemma in
the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness
of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it
implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes
an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease
with the bribe (and increase with higher quality).
As we will see in the next section, our model presents multiple equilibria for
firms. The interesting point is that, according to the monetary maximization theory,
public officials should always prefer the firm that offers the highest transfer of
bribe. Therefore firms and officials have divergent preferences.
The chapter is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the model. Third
section concludes.
2.2 The model
Our model is inspired on the theoretical framework of Büchner et al. (2008) in
which pairs of sellers bid to obtain a public contract and the bid of each seller
could include a bribe to be paid to the public official. Consider the variation of the
previous model. A game is played between two firms (i, j) bidding for a procure-
ment contract which will be granted to one of the two firms by a public auctioneer
(official). Like in the original framework, bidding takes place in two dimensions.
However, in our version, the social externality of the winning project, net of social
or private costs affects uniformly to all agents. Thus, rather than the price paid
by the state to the winning firm, the first bidding dimension is a bidder quality
net of costs (Qi ≤ A, where A represents an exogenously given upper bound to
quality). This allows us to model the first dimension of bidding as a simple linear,
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monotonically increasing function of the winning project social quality benefiting
unambiguously all agents, the auctioneer, the two firms and, potentially (as we do
in a follow-up of this chapter), the society surrounding them. The second dimen-
sion is a bribe (Bi) promised and finally paid by the winner of the auction to the
auctioneer. Furthermore, in order to guarantee that a social dilemma emerges in this
bribery game, we impose a restriction on bribes and qualities1: Qi + Bi ≤ A. We
use a linear specification of the three agents’ monetary (induced) utilities, adding
a psychological cost parameter, γ, capturing an agent’s aversion to bribe due to
ethical reasons, expressed in monetary loss per monetary unit of bribe received by
the official. Thus, the three agents’ utility levels are given by:
πofficial = F + a ·Qwinner + (1 − γofficial) ·Bwinner (2.1)
πwinner = F + a ·Qwinner − (c+ γwinner) ·Bwinner +R (2.2)
πloser = F + a ·Qwinner (2.3)
Where F is a fixed amount earned by each subject in each period, R is a fixed
private profit obtained by the firm winning the procurement. Finally, a denotes the
social return of the winning project’s quality on each player’s utility and c a per
monetary unit of bribe cost, borne by a bribing winner, denoting that the bribe may
yield further monetary costs on its way from the firm to the official. Assuming
perfect information on the agents’ preferences, the resolution of the game depends
on the hypothesis of continuous versus discrete strategies.
2.2.1 Continuous strategies
In this section we study the theoretical prediction of the game assuming a continuos
space of strategies. We first solve the case in which agents have non-monetary
(psychological) concerning, then the case in which agents purely maximize their
payoffs.




1. If a > 1−γofficial , the highest quality project will be chosen and firms will bid
only in qualities, leading to the equilibrium: (Qi, Bi) = (Qj, Bj) = (A, 0)
independently of the firms’ preferences.
2. If a < 1 − γofficial , the highest bribe will be preferred by the auctioneer. In
that case, firms will bid with the maximum bribe they can, as long as the
bribing (monetary and psychological) cost does not exceed the fixed amount






Thus, we would expect officials to choose the highest quality proposals if they
are sufficiently bribery-averse, while they will choose the bidder with the highest
bribe otherwise. Firms (believing that they are) faced with a quality-maximizing
auctioneer will not bid with bribes, independently of their own preferences, whereas
firms anticipating a bribery-maximizing behavior by the auctioneer will promise
higher bribes, the less bribery averse they are.
Finally, in absence of psychological, bribe-regarding considerations, a monetary-
reward maximizing behavior would predict maximal quality bids,
(Qi, Bi) = (Qj, Bj) = (A, 0), if a > 1, and (Qi, Bi) = (A− Rc ,
R
c
), if a < 1,
in which case, the social dilemma leads to a socially suboptimal equilibrium. In the
linear version, the following parameters are adopted, (F, a, A,R, c) = (10, 1/2, 10, 10, 2),
which guarantee the emergence of the social dilemma equilibrium bids: (Qi, Bi) =
(Qj, Bj) = (5, 5) in the case of bribery-neutral agents with universal preference
for the bribe-maximizing bids by the official, or top quality (Qi, Bi) = (Qj, Bj) =
(A, 0), and quality maximizing auctioneer behavior if γofficial > 1/2.
2.2.2 Discrete strategies
Our game’s theoretical prediction differs when considering discrete strategies. The
matrix in figure 2.1 shows the payoffs of both firms for different combinations
of bribe (and quality). In the discrete game there are two strong Nash equilibria
(Qi, Bi, Qj, Bj) = (7, 3, 7, 3) and (Qi, Bi, Qj, Bj) = (6, 4, 6, 4) where the former
is Pareto superior to the latter.
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The (Qi, Bi, Qj, Bj) = (5, 5, 5, 5) is still a weak equilibrium and also Pareto dom-
inated by both the other two. It is weak, because each firm is indifferent between
this and bidding lower bribes just to become a loser (it earns 12.5 units in both
cases).
Figure 2.1: Matrix for discrete strategies.
2.3 Summary
A model of public procurement auction is developed in this chapter where two
firms compete and have the possibility to bribe for winning the contest. We im-
posed a social dilemma to the firms and we added a psychological cost parameter
coming from bribing as it consists of an “unethical” behavior. We also consider the
situation where no psychological parameters are included. Specific parameters are
included in the model and we obtain the theoretical prediction either with continu-
ous strategies or with discrete strategies. We believe that this model is interesting to










As many studies have already demonstrated, corruption has fatal consequences, and
this is why the study of this phenomenon is gaining a high interest among academ-
ics. By fatal consequences we understand the negative effect that corruption has at
a macroeconomic level. From a total of 70 countries, Mauro (1995) demonstrates
the negative effect that corruption may have on growth. Gupta et al. (2002) show
that corruption is positively correlated to poverty in terms of income distribution.
Moreover at a microeconomic level there are huge repercussions. For instance, cor-
rupt officials can deny basic goods procurement, medicines, house light and water
or even they extract people’s income by imposing ‘unfair’ conditions.1 Corruption
1Many of these examples can be found in www.ipaidabribe.com. Through this website, every-
body can report its own experience with bribery.
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is commonly defined as the abuse of public office for private gain. When research-
ers contemplate the idea of studying corruption, they are confronting a big chal-
lenge, since no real, accurate and accounted data exists on bribes amounts. Indeed,
this is due to the pure nature of corruption: it is secret and illegal. Corruption could
be compared to drug dealing as it is an illegal and secret activity as well. Thus,
an attempt of calculating the actual transfer values are just speculation. Despite
the impediments, there are alternative ways to study corruption. For instance, the
empirical studies on corruption are generally based on surveys1. Van Rijckeghem
and Weder (2001) find evidence that high wages for public employees decrease the
attraction for bribery. Dollar et al. (2001), prove that the high representation of wo-
men in the parliament is associated with lower levels of corruption. Although the
surveys’ results are used as a proxy of corruption levels, some works demonstrate
their limitations. Olken (2009) finds biases in the reported corruption perception,
which may lead to wrong results. The author conducted an experiment in Indonesia
finding differences between what villagers reported as perception of corruption in a
road-building project in their village, and a more objective measure called ‘missing
expenditures’, in the project. One of the explanations given for this divergence is
that, in this village, the corruption is hidden by magnifying the quantities employed
for the project. This way makes more difficult to detect the corruption by the civil
population.
An alternative way to deal with the study of corruption is the experimental
methodology which consists of collecting data from a controlled environment seek-
ing to eliminate outside factors. Experiments on corruption may provide the out-
come of real behavior in a corruption controlled simulated scenario. Knowing that
the real data of corruption are impossible to observe and, although subjects know-
ing they are being observed may take the moral decision when morality and wealth
are competing (Levitt and List, 2007), we believe that experimental economics is a
powerful approach for this topic especially in the field of procurement auctions. By
1Transparency International publishes annually the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which
ranks countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and
opinion surveys. Surveys/assessments are either business people opinion surveys or performance
assessments from a group of analysts.
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using the experimental methodology, we aim at contributing to the understanding
of the behavioral components of bribery.
In this chapter we experimentally test the auction model introduced in chapter
2 where two firms compete, by posting their bids on quality and bribe, for obtain-
ing the license of a public project. Then, an official in charge of designating the
winner of the auction observes firms’ bids and decides which one he considers as
the deserving of the license.
The theoretical prediction of the game has the property to induce firms to bribe
in a specific amount and officials to decide in favor of the highest bribe offer re-
ceived. Therefore, the aim of this work is to test in the laboratory the real behavior
of people with respect to the theoretical prediction of the game. We analyze sub-
jects’ decisions in the role of firms or officials in the context of a specific auction,
where bribery is permitted. Our results suggest that people deviate from the theor-
etical prediction, exhibiting pro-social preferences.
In addition, we evaluate an alternative and, a priori, more efficient way to deter
bribery, i.e. without the costs of monitoring and legal prosecutions. Thus, we run
two treatments to compare the effect of two different matching protocols: partners
with fixed matching over time and strangers with random matching in each interac-
tion. We obtain that a strangers matching protocol reduces the propensity to engage
in bribery and, after some periods, it increases the social welfare. This result is in
line with Abbink (2004).
Finally, some gender effects have been found, as women in the role of officials are
more willing than men to choose the pro-social option.
3.2 Experimental literature on corruption
When we explore the experimental literature on bribery we perceive that the exper-
iments are mainly used for two purposes: on the one hand, to extract characteristics
that may explain a pro-bribe behavior or, on the contrary an aversion to bribery, on
the other hand, to examine how to deter the incentives to bribe.
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3.2.1 Specific typologies of population
Part of the experimental literature on corruption is addressed to find some character-
istics of a specific population that could explain a determined behavior concerning
bribery. Those works study, for instance, whether a specific group of population has
more aversion to bribe, more tolerance, or the opposite. Frank and Schulze (2000)
study subjects in the role of public officials. Participants face a trade-off between
maximizing individual profit and maximizing the gains of the public interest. Ap-
parently due to self-selection, economics students tend more to corruptibility than
non-economics students. Some gender results were found, such as economists men
are the most corrupt and non-economist men the least.
Alatas et al. (2009b) execute an experiment in Indonesia with public servants and
students finding that those who are more exposed in daily life to corruption (public
servants) are significantly less tolerant to corruption than students.
The effect of culture has been also studied in the experimental literature of bribery.
Cameron et al. (2009) study the effect of culture on the propensity to engage on
bribery or on punishing it. Their main interest was to observe whether those coun-
tries ranked with low levels of corruption were those where there is a lower engage-
ment on bribery and higher punishment. Their cross-cultural study is replicated in
Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore. Their results show that, on the one hand,
in India subjects are more tolerant to corruption than in Australia, on the other hand,
surprisingly, in Indonesia are much less tolerant than in Singapore. However, the
authors did not find important differences in the propensity to engage on bribery.
Barr and Serra (2010) explore the correlation between Oxford University students’
country of origin and their decision on a bribery game. In a first study done in 2005,
they find that a correlation exists as subjects coming from more corrupt countries
are those taking the more pro-bribe decisions, but this result was true just for un-
dergraduate students. In the second study, run in 2007, the authors slightly modify
the design and now the public officials are the ones moving first and asking for a
bribe. The authors also though about an important variable to consider: they ask
subjects about the time spent in UK. As a result, they find a socialization effect.
Thus, the propensity to bribe decreases over time spent in UK.
Banuri and Eckel (2012) run a bribery game with punishment in US and Pakistan,
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finding that without punishment, the levels of bribery are not different between the
two countries, but cross-cultural differences appear in the levels of punishment.
Some works analyze the effect of framing on experiments of corruption, obtaining
different results. Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) run two treatments of their
bribery game, one with negative connotation in the instructions and the second
with neutral framing, finding no significant differences between them. Barr and
Serra (2009), however, find some significant differences when comparing framed
versus neutral instructions. Differently from Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006),
in their design, the agents implied on the bribery exchange are a citizen and an
official. The authors claim that subjects feel more identified with the word ‘cit-
izen’ than with ‘firm’ when playing in a bribery experiment. The authors study the
framing effect combined with high versus low negative externalities on other play-
ers. Their main results suggest that framed instructions decreases the propensity
to offer bribe from citizens, specially with high negative externalities. However,
weak differences are found on public officials propensity to accept or reject bribes
when comparing framed versus abstract instructions. Lambsdorff and Frank (2010)
study framing from another perspective. The authors analyze the effect of choos-
ing endogenously between two loaded frames in which a business-person as first
mover chooses whether to use the word ‘bribe’ versus ‘gift’ to give to the pub-
lic servant. As a result, business people who choose the word ‘bribe’ exhibited
a higher propensity to punish public servants who did not reciprocate them than
those choosing the word ‘gift’.
As is recurrent in the experimental literature, bribery is found to be correlated to
gender. Rivas (2013), Alatas et al. (2009a), Frank and Schulze (2000), or Schulze
and Frank (2003) are good examples.1
3.2.2 Deterring bribery
Researchers dealing with corruption are mainly interested in understanding what
is provoking people to engage on bribery and, furthermore, how it can be stopped.
In fact, an important part of the experimental literature on corruption deals with
1For a deep understanding of this specific feature see the survey on gender and bribery experi-
ments by Frank et al. (2010).
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the severals ways in which bribery can be deterred. Most of the settings consist of
running firstly a baseline treatment where bribe is permitted with no repercussions
on those who are engaging on bribe. Then subjects play treatments in which a vari-
able is manipulated in order to evaluate the effect of this modification. Generally,
in these settings bribe-offers, bribe-takers or both are potentially exposed to some
sanctions that are supposed to dissuade them from bribing.
For instance, the effect of the risk of detection has been studied by several authors.
Schulze and Frank (2003) compare a baseline treatment with no possibility of de-
tection and a control treatment with a probability of detection. Their results suggest
that monitoring reduces the propensity to bribe at the cost of reducing the intrinsic
motivation of being honest.
In the design made by Serra (2012), the public official is the one who asks for a
bribe and the citizen may accept paying it or not. The research interest of this work
is to compare the effect of different systems of monitoring. Considering weak in-
stitutional contexts where top-down monitoring systems are not effective because
of a lack of incentives among other reasons, the author wonders whether bottom-up
monitoring could deter corruption. The results show that the combination of both,
top-down and bottom-up, can reduce corruption levels.
Armantier and Boly (2011) execute a field experiment in Burkina Faso where sub-
jects have to grade 20 exams from which the eleventh, with many mistakes, con-
tains a banknote and post-it paper with the following sentence: ‘Please, find few
mistakes in my exam paper’. They manipulate the interesting variables of bribe,
wages and monitoring levels and they obtain that the higher the bribe the higher is
the probability to accept it. Higher wages reduce the probability of accepting the
bribe, however it increases the reciprocation from the bribee. They found also that
monitoring and punishment can be effective anti-corruption measures. However, in
line with Schulze and Frank (2003), a crowding out effect on intrinsic motivation
for being honest appears. Reporting has been also studied to analyze its effects on
the propensity to bribe.
Abbink et al. (2014) run a set of experiments attempting to test the validity of Basu
(2011) in which he proposes, on the one hand, punishing public officials as bribe-
takers and, on the other hand, legally protecting bribe-givers like ordinary citizens
who just seek to receive a service. Their results suggest that immunity for bribe
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givers reduce the propensity to demand bribes from bribe-takers and increases the
willingness to report. Furthermore, the authors compare a treatment with bribe re-
funded to the citizen with one in which the bribe is not refunded. They find that
reporting behavior does not depend just on monetary incentives but also on intrinsic
motivations.
In this work we are specially interested in the one by Abbink (2004) as they analyze
the net effect of partners matching vs strangers matching, as a potential policy to
deter bribery. The author replicated the design of Abbink et al. (2002) where three
treatments were run: the baseline consists of a variation of a trust game between
a firm, as potential briber and an official, as bribee. In the second treatment, they
analyze the effect of an exogenous negative externality that affects all the players
when a pair is engaging on bribe and finally, the third treatment studies the effect
of having a risk of being detected and punished. Their results demonstrate that
the penalty risk reduces significantly the propensity to engage in bribe, although
the negative externality treatment has not significant effect. Each treatment was a
repeated interaction during 30 periods, thus the matching protocol used was part-
ners. Therefore, the aim of Abbink (2004) is to calculate the effect of a long term
relationship among agents (partners) versus a one-shot repeated interaction where
pairs of firm-official change every period (strangers). Their main results suggest
that a rotation among agents, first, decrease the propensity to engage on bribery
from both sides, i.e. lower transfers of bribes and lower reciprocation, and second,
the efficiency increases.
As suggested by Abbink, we develop the study of the effect produced by the differ-
ent matching protocols, in a different context. Specifically, our scenario consists of
an auction for a public procurement where two firms compete for wining the con-
test by posting their bids on quality and bribe. After observing the bids, an official
as auctioneer decides on the winner firm. We rather choose a public auction with
two firms competing, as we believe that is the kind of corruption which is causing
the highest damage in the society. In contrast with Abbink’s, in our game the theor-
etical prediction is such that it induces people to engage in bribery. Moreover, our
model has an endogenous externality depending on quality, i.e. the higher is the
quality of the winning firm, the higher are the earnings for all the members in the
group, however, Abbink includes an exogenous externality as a treatment. We also
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compare a fixed matching (partners) with a random matching (strangers) along 10
periods instead of 30.
3.3 Experimental Design
3.3.1 Theory and main hypotheses
We explicitly introduce a tradeoff between bribe and quality bids. In the bidding
stage, two firms post simultaneously sealed quality bids and bribes to be paid in
case the bidder is the winner of the auction. In the final stage, on the basis of the
bids received, an official chooses one of the bids. The winner’s quality benefits all
players, whereas the bribe is antisocial and inefficient, as it is paid at the cost of
a lower quality and an extra loss by the bribing winner. Thus, firms face a moral
dilemma in the sense that the higher a firm’s promised bribe, the more likely for
the firm to be the winner of the auction. Also, officials face a dilemma, as their
selfish preference for bids entailing higher bribes goes against the interest of all
other players and overall welfare.1
For the implementation in the laboratory, we have applied the restriction: Q+B ≤
A for each firm-subject’s strategies, reflecting the trade-off between quality and
bribe. We have used the parameter set (F, a, c, A,R) = (10,
1
2
, 2, 10, 10). Taking
this payoff structure into account, implying that agents care only for the monetary
consequences of their actions and assuming a continuous strategy space, the unique
Nash equilibrium is such that both firms’ bids involve (Q,B) = (5, 5). That is,
like in Bertrand competition, in equilibrium firms will be willing to spend on the
bribe as much as the bonus they obtain from winning the auction. However, for
simplicity, our experiment is run with a discrete strategy space, allowing only for
integer quality and bribe bids. Then, multiple equilibria emerge including (Q,B) =
(7, 3) and (Q,B) = (6, 4). In this case, the unique continuous-strategy equilibrium
(Q,B) = (5, 5) becomes a weak equilibrium, since each firm is indifferent between
this and posting lower bribes, then becoming a loser (with a 12.5 payoff in both
cases).
1The theoretical model and its predictions are developed in chapter 2.
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Based on this game and the parameters implemented in the laboratory, we aim
at testing three hypotheses concerning firms’ behavior.
• Hypothesis 1: Firms will collude on high bribes and low quality.
• Hypothesis 2: Firms will coordinate in the Pareto superior equilibrium.
• Hypothesis 3: A rotation among agents (strangers matching) will decrease
the propensity to engage on bribery.
3.3.2 Procedures
Two sessions were conducted in the Laboratory of Experimental Economics (LEE)
at the University Jaume I. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The sample consisted of 66 subjects. Each
‘market’ consisted of a group of 3 players: 2 firms and 1 official. They never
knew the identity of other group members and communication among them was
strictly forbidden. Participants played 10 rounds. The information received at the
end of each round was different for firms and for officials: firms knew their payoff
in current round, accumulated payoff and who was the winner firm of the license.
They never knew the offer made by the other firm. Firms had the option to not
exhaust their budget restriction, although it is inefficient. The official knew quality
and bribe offers from both firms, own payoff in the current round and accumulated
payoffs.
To complete the study, the experimental subjects performed a standard demographic
questionnaire, so that we could extract some data on variables like gender1, Trust2,
1Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if female, 0 for men.
2For this variable, we have been inspired on the World Value Survey (1981-2008) where we
asked subjects the following questions. (Our answers where Yes / NO):
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very
careful in dealing with people?
2. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they
try to be fair?
3. Do you think most people try to help others or most people worry for themselves?
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Parents Education1, Religion2, Membership3. To perform our analysis, all these
variables have been normalized to dichotomous variables.
3.3.3 Treatments
We carried out two treatments to compare results through a between subjects ana-
lysis: first a treatment with matching partners (henceforth PT) in which each sub-
ject remains in the same group and with same role throughout 10 periods. In the
first period, subjects were grouped randomly and anonymously in groups of three.
They received information about their payoffs at the end of each period. In the
second treatment, matching was strangers (henceforth ST) where the groups are
also formed randomly and anonymously, but its components change every round.
The role of each subject (firm or official) remains the same for all rounds.
3.4 Results
The analysis of the experimental data is organized as follows. First, we present an
overview of the descriptive statistics of the sample, then we analyze the behavior
of subjects in the role of officials, and, finally we make an analysis of the decisions
of subjects in the role of firms.
3.4.1 Database
Table 3.1 gives us an overview of the sample according to the results from the ques-
tionnaire of socio-demographic variables. We include the results of testing whether
significant differences exist between men and women for those magnitudes.
The sample is almost balanced between men and women: 36 women and 30
men. A total of 27 subjects played PT and 39 played ST. In table 3.1 we observe
1Measures the level of education received by the parents of the subject. Subjects were asked
about the level of studies of their parents: elementary school / high school / university / PhD. The
more level of studies they have, the higher is the value.
2Indicates whether the individual has received a religious education in elementary school, sec-
ondary and high school. The result is between 0 and 3, 3 being the sum of the three options.
3Was obtained by questioning subjects on the number of organizations to which they belonged
(sports organizations, unions, political, local, N.G.O...).
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Table 3.1: General Desriptive Statistics
Statistics Men Women Total Rank M.-W.(z)
N 30 36 66
PT 13 14 27
ST 17 22 39
Economists 17 22 39
Other Studies 13 14 27
Trust (avg) 1.28 1.00 1.15 [0-3] 3.10***
Parents education (avg) 5.48 5.39 5.44 [0-12] 0.13
Membership (avg) 1.04 0.74 0.90 [0-5] 4.70***
Religion (avg) 1.28 1.09 1.19 [0-3] 1.28
*** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%
that men are significantly more trustful than women (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
z=3.10, p<0.01). Moreover, men belong significantly to more organizations than
women (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z=4.70, p<0.01). No other significant dif-
ferences are found.
3.4.2 Officials’ decisions
This subsection is addressed to understand the decisions made by officials. Official-
subjects as auctioneers decide the firm that will win the license in the current
period. Officials’ decisions are based on the offers of bribe and quality made by the
two firms. In that way, we induce them to face several dilemmas since in our setup
officials are not allowed to reject bribes, hence their decisions are either to maxim-
ize bribe or to maximize quality. Taking this aspect into account, we distinguish
between two types of decisions made by officials: monetary payoffs maximizing
decisions and pro-social decisions. The payoff maximizing decisions consist in
giving the license to the firm offering more bribe, given that the quality level of the
winning firm is equal or inferior to that of the loser firm.
Pro-social are those decisions corresponding to quality maximization. This option
reveals that officials are exhibiting other preferences than just monetary maximiz-
ation. In fact, officials when deciding according to quality are taking into consid-
eration other than own personal benefit but rather social earnings, in the sense that
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they reveal a pro-social attitude. In this case, the official gives the license to the
firm that offers higher quality level, given that the bribe of the winning firm is at
least equal than the one of the loser.1
3.4.2.1 Bribe vs Quality maximizing decisions
Figure 3.1 presents, on aggregate for the two sessions, the distribution of officials’
decisions according to the two profiles: bribe or monetary maximizing decisions
and pro-social or quality maximizing decisions. Among all the offers received by
officials, in 67.01% of the cases, they decided according to bribe, that is to say,
following a pure monetary maximization. In contrast, 32.99% of their choices are
in favor of quality, hence acting in a pro-social way.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of officials’ decisions according to the two profiles: bribe
maximizer or quality maximizer.
Aggregatif the data of the two session, we show in figure 3.2 the time evolution
of officials’ decisions. In the first period, bribe maximizing decisions taken by
1We exclude from the analysis the irrational decisions which consist of giving the license to the
firm offering lower quality and lower or equal bribe than the loser firm.
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officials are around 40%. Compared to quality maximizing profile, along time
this payoff maximizing behavior predominates until the end, being around 60% on
average.
Figure 3.2: Percentage of officials’ bribe maximizing decisions over time, for full
sample.
This setup induces officials to act in a selfish way by choosing the highest bribe-
offer made by firms. However, it is remarkable the fact that one third of the de-
cisions made by officials are against the pure selfish monetary interest. Rather they
are compatible with a pro-social behavior.
When a potential pair of briber and bribee interact in a long term relationship,
the propensity to engage on bribery is higher as an outcome of a trustful relation-
ship. In fact, we expect that a strangers matching protocol would eliminate the long
term trustful relationship among agents, which is a factor that encourages corrup-
tion in real life. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate for officials the differences between
their decisions in the two treatments. Observe that in ST pro-social behavior signi-
ficantly increases given that the amount of quality maximizing decisions are higher
than they are in PT (35.87% versus 27.94%, respectively)1. As in Abbink (2004),
1Pearson χ2(1)=3.36, p<0.10.
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we find that a rotation among agents increases the pro-social attitudes of officials.
Figure 3.3: Officials’ decisions per treatment
Some conclusions from this section can be extracted so far: officials are not
exclusively maximizing their private payoff. Rather, one third of the times they
reject bribes and they prefer to seek a more socially efficient outcome. Moreover,
a rotation among firms and public officials in each interaction increases pro-social
behavior by officials. Then, a recommendation addressed to policy makers claims
that forcing public officials to rotate when interacting with private firms might re-
duce the propensity of engaging in bribery.
Result 1: Although the game induces officials to accept the highest bribe, one
third of them reveal other-preferences and deviate from monetary maximization.
Result 2: A rotation among agents in every period (ST) increases significantly




Figure 3.4: Officials’ decisions per treatment: Bribe maximizing decisions over time.
3.4.3 Firms’ decisions
In this subsection we analyze firms-subjects’ decision making. Remember that
subjects’ deciding as firms have to post their bids of quality and bribe to the official.
3.4.3.1 Bribe aversion and quality attraction
On average, firms invest 6.22 units in quality and offer 2.5 units of bribe. Figure
3.5 shows the aggregate distribution of quality and bribe. This picture reflects
the deviations existing from the induced utility in our model. The distribution for
quality and bribe are mostly concentrated on the right hand side and left hand side
of the Nash equilibria, respectively.
Figure 3.6 shows, on aggregate, the evolution of average bribe and quality
amounts over time. This plot enhances our result on deviations from the theor-
etical prediction and it is consistent in time, specially for the case of bribing. We
observe a propensity to offer lower bribes than the theoretical prediction. In addi-
tion, the curve of bribe slightly decreases over time: the average bribe is 2.7 units
in the first period and 2 units in period 10 (Wicoxon matched-pairs signed-rank
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Figure 3.5: Distribution functions for bribe and quality.
test p<0.10). As a consequence, quality has a growing slope and remains above
the Nash equilibrium values over time. The average quality in the first period is
5.8 units and reaches 7 in the last period (Wicoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test
p<0.01).
Subjects in the role of firms behave in a particular way. On the one hand, their
decisions on quality fit with the theoretical prediction. On the other hand, their de-
cisions on bribe reveal that subjects playing as firms do not behave as purely payoff
maximizers as they deviate from the Nash equilibria by posting lower bribes than
predicted.
If we analyze the data by treatment, we obtain that the average bribe in PT is
2.99 units, which is significantly higher than the average bribe in ST, 2.15 units
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z=5.76, p<0.01). Consistently with Abbink (2004)
we find that a random and anonymous rotation system among agents when inter-
acting in this type of environment can be a good way to slow corruption down.
The average quality bid in PT is 6.55 units, versus 5.99 units in ST. Thus, the
average level of quality with a fixed matching is higher than with a random match-
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Figure 3.6: Time evolution of bribe and quality.
ing protocol, although this difference is not significant (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test z=1.40, p=0.16). Our firms achieve at reducing bribery but at the cost of also
slightly reducing quality. Figure 3.7 and 3.8 shows the time evolution of average
decisions for quality and bribe, by treatment. Observe that in ST bribes are lower
than in PT for all periods, however, quality bids are also lower. The differences in
bribing are significant in periods 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 10. No significant differences
are found on quality, for any period (data in table 3.2 support this result). On the
one hand, a rotation mechanism reduces bribery, and, on the other hand, it reduces
quality which, as a consequence, yield social externality to be lower for all players.
This result is confirmed when observing the distribution of bribe and quality
for each treatment. We clearly observe a higher frequency of bidding 10 units of
quality in ST than in PT (figure 3.9). The modal in PT is 6 units of quality compare
to the 8 units in ST. Distributions are significantly different (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
D=0.27, p<0.01). Likewise, for bribe bids we observe clear differences in distribu-
tions by comparing PT vs ST (figure 3.10). First, the frequency of bidding 0 units
bribe by firms is clearly higher in ST. Second, the modal in PT is 4 units while in ST
is 2 units. Distributions are significantly different (Kolmogorov-Smirnov D=0.21,
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Figure 3.7: Treatment effects in time evolution of quality.
Figure 3.8: Treatment effects in time evolution of bribe.
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Table 3.2: Bribe and quality averages, and Mann-Whitney test, per period.
Period Bribe Quality
PT ST PT ST
avg. s.d. avg. s.d. M.W. (z) avg. s.d. avg. s.d. M.W. (z)
1 3.11 1.02 2.46 2.21 1.81* 6.28 1.27 5.54 2.72 0.22
2 2.89 1.37 2.35 1.72 1.12 6.67 1.61 5.73 2.58 0.29
3 3.39 1.29 2.46 1.94 1.92* 6.50 1.34 5.96 2.57 0.39
4 3.78 1.21 2.12 1.88 3.37*** 5.83 1.62 5.38 2.91 0.93
5 2.72 1.45 2.15 2.07 1.26 6.78 1.80 5.58 3.13 0.19
6 2.67 1.49 1.81 1.30 1.84* 6.83 1.69 6.08 2.65 0.52
7 3.00 1.75 2.04 1.61 1.73* 6.44 2.03 6.08 2.75 0.83
8 2.94 1.40 2.31 1.85 1.45 6.67 1.61 6.31 2.90 0.88
9 2.78 1.52 2.23 1.53 1.24 6.67 1.88 6.12 2.85 0.69
10 2.67 1.33 1.58 1.42 2.38** 6.83 1.42 7.08 2.65 0.24
Total 2.99 1.40 2.15 1.76 5.76*** 6.55 1.63 5.99 2.77 0.16
*** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%
p<0.01).
Result 3: A random matching protocol reduces both, quality (not significantly)
and bribe (significantly) bids made my firms.
This result gives us interesting evidence concerning the testable hypotheses ex-
posed in subsection 3. First, hypothesis 1 of collusion is rejected since collusion is
possible just in PT because there is a repeated interaction among the same subjects,
however, we find significantly higher bribes in the majority of the periods in PT
compared to ST. Therefore, we discard hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 remains possible
because deviations from the theoretical prediction could plausibly be explained by
coordination in Pareto-superior equilibria. Second, hypothesis 3 is confirmed as a
rotation among agents decreases the propensity to engage on bribery.
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Figure 3.9: Distribution functions of quality.
Figure 3.10: Treatment effects in distribution functions.
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3.4.4 Efficiency and Social Welfare
In the previous subsection we analyzed firms’ decisions on bribe and quality, ob-
taining lower bids with a random matching (ST) than with a fixed matching (PT).
We now analyze the treatment effect on efficiency and social welfare. We consider
efficient decisions those decisions situated in the upper half side of the diagonal of
the budget restriction, i.e. those fulfilling two conditions: first, Qi +Bi = 10, and,
second Bi ≤ 5. We remind that in the experimental implementation, the restriction
for firms bids is such that Qi +Bi ≤ 10. Thus, given this restriction, firms have the
option to not exhaust their resources, although it is inefficient.
Figure 3.11 illustrates the average time evolution of the spending (Qi+Bi) for each
treatment separately and for the full sample. We clearly observe that firm-subjects
are taking inefficient decisions as the average spendings are 8.71 units for the full
sample. This inefficiency is even clearer for ST as the spending are 8.13 units on
average, while in PT their are 9.54 units (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z=7.32,
p<0.01). In ST, it seems that over time firms learn to take more efficient decisions:
the average spending in period 1 is 8.00 units and it increases to 8.65 units in period
10.
Figure 3.11: Time evolution of spendings (quality + bribe).
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Figures 3.12 and 3.13 illustrate the quality and bribe bids density per treatment.
The efficient decisions should be localized in the upper left side of the diagonal,
combining bids of quality superior or equal than 5 units and, bids of bribe inferior
or equal than 5 units. We observe a big amount of inefficient decisions, especially
in treatment ST.
Figure 3.12: Observations density for treatment PT.
Result 4: Firms are taking inefficient decisions by not exhausting their budget
restriction. This result is even more evident with a random matching protocol.
We have just analyzed how a random matching system induce firm-subjects to
take inefficient decisions in the sense that they are not exhausting their restriction
of quality and bribe. The question is whether the two treatments are different from
a social welfare point of view. We measure social welfare as the total payoffs of




i , where w= winner firm,
l= loser firm, and o= official.
Figure 3.14 shows the average time evolution of social welfare, by treatment.
For the first 5 periods the curve of PT is always above the one of ST. The average so-
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Figure 3.13: Observations density for treatment ST.
Figure 3.14: Evolution of social welfare, by treatment.
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cial welfare from period 1 to 5 is 46.10 units in PT and 45.01 units in ST (Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test z=1.85, p<0.10). However, after period 5 we observe a switch
as the average social welfare in ST (47.60 units) becomes significantly higher than
in PT (45.97 units) (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z=-4.63, p<0.01). On aggreg-
ate for the 10 periods, the average social welfare in ST is slightly higher than in
PT (with 46.29 units and 46.03 units respectively) (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
z=-1.84, p<0.10).
Therefore, it seems that a random matching among agents is yielding inefficient
decisions, specially at the beginning of the session (period 1 to 5), thus although
bribe is lower, social welfare is also lower than with fixed matching. After some
periods, firm-subjects seem to learn how to take more efficient decisions in ST and
social welfare becomes significantly higher than in PT.
Result 5: Inefficient decisions in the first periods yield to lower social wel-
fare under strangers matching. After some periods, the average social welfare in
strangers overtakes the one in partners.
3.4.5 Individual characteristics: Gender
The analysis starts by examining officials’ decisions. Among men, 78.5% of de-
cisions are in favor of bribe and 21.95% in favor of quality. For women, these
values are 63.87% and 36.13%, respectively (see figure 3.15). Women playing
as officials exhibit more pro-social behavior than men playing that role (Pearson
χ2(1)=2.80, p<0.10)
In the role of firms, men offer higher quality than women. The average quality
bid made my men is significantly higher (6.48 units) than the one made by wo-
men (5.90 units) (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z=2.72, p<0.01) (figure 3.16). No
significant differences are found on bribe: the average bribe bid made by men
is 2.44 units versus 2.56 units made by women (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
z=0.86, p=0.39) (figure 3.17). These results let us think that women as firms are
taking more inefficient than men. In fact, the average spending of men is signi-
ficantly higher than the one of women, with 8.92 units and 8.46 units respectively
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z=2.92, p<0.01).
34
3.4 Results
Figure 3.15: Officials’ preferences, by gender.
Figure 3.16: Time evolution of quality.
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Figure 3.17: Time evolution of bribe.
Result 6: Women in the role of public officials are more willing to take pro-
social decisions. However, in the role of firms they bid higher bribe and lower
quality than men, mainly due to more inefficient decisions.
3.5 Conclusions
We experimentally test a bribery game in an auction context where two types of
agents interact. Two firms competing for winning a license for a public project
and one official who decides the winner of the license. Firms compete by posting
simultaneously the amount of quality and bribe for this project. In the next stage,
officials (according to firms’ offers and to their own preferences) decide to which
firm they want to assign the license. In this game, quality is endogenous and pro-
social (equally increasing all players earnings). Bribe is unfair (increases inequal-
ity), anti-social, inefficient (it costs more to sender than contributes to receiver) and
more attractive (than quality) to the official. The benchmark of this game is the
theoretical prediction which in the discrete game there are two strong Nash equi-
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libria: (Qi, Bi, Qj, Bj) = (7, 3, 7, 3) and (Qi, Bi, Qj, Bj) = (6, 4, 6, 4) where the
former is Pareto superior to the latter. In the continuous version, the equilibrium is
(Qi, Bi, Qj, Bj) = (5, 5, 5, 5) which is a weak equilibrium and also Pareto domin-
ated by both the other two. In this study we implemented in the laboratory the game
considered in the previous chapter, as our purpose is to investigate how real people
behave in this particular context. Officials’ behavior reveals a clear (one third of
decisions) deviation towards pro-social choice which gives a further explanation
for firms’ behavior. The existence of pro-social behavior favors the emergence of
less corrupt behavior by firms. Although coordination on Pareto-superior equilibria
and/or collusion can not be, a priori, rouled out, through the test of comparing PT
and ST we get evidence against the hypothesis of collusion between firms because
rather than less bribes in PT, higher bribes are found. In this line, chapter 3 extends
this specific point of view with the foundation of intrinsic or extrinsic motivation.
Furthermore, in line with Abbink (2004), we confirm that staff rotation could
be a precautionary measure against corruption in some levels of government. We
re-matched randomly groups of firms and officials in every round and we found that
levels of bribe decrease significantly with respect to the treatment in which group
composition was the same along all the rounds. The fact that in each period subjects
had to establish new relationships may disincentive bribery, and even more when
we consider that bribery requires a trustful relationship among agents. Neverthe-
less, we also observe that this random re-matching mechanism also reduces quality
investment. We thus wondered whether this policy that achieves at reducing bribe
would finally be socially inefficient. We find subjects under a random matching
are taking significantly more inefficient decisions than with a fixed matching yield-
ing to a lower social welfare. However, our result reinforces the one of Abbink
as definitively staff rotation decreases bribe and, after some periods, social welfare
is increased. We do not forget the limitations that could exist from extrapolating
laboratory results to real life.
We finally studied the relation between decisions on bribery and some personal
characteristics. We discovered some gender effect. Women playing in the role
of firms offer higher bribes and significantly lower quality than men, while when
playing as officials they are more pro-social. This result advocates that women
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bribe in order not to be excluded of the system that is already perceived as cor-
rupt, but when women have the discretionary power of deciding (i.e. they play as
officials) they make public their preferences against bribery and in favor of social
welfare. Following Alatas et al. (2009a) we prefer to keep this result as specific of
the idiosyncrasy of the subjects’ pool instead of exposing its global validity.
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3.6 Appendix: Instructions to experimental subjects
(translated from Spanish)
Welcome and thanks for your participation in this experiment. Please switch off
your mobile phones and secure your belongings away. You are going to particip-
ate in an experimental session of 10 rounds. You will earn an amount of money
which will depend on your decisions and the decisions of other participants in the
session. From this moment onwards you must use only the instructions and the
computer in front of you. If you have any questions throughout the session, please
raise your hand and you will receive an answer by one of the experimentalists. Any
communication with other participants will imply your immediate exclusion from
the experiment.
At the beginning of this session, you will be assigned one of two roles: ‘a firm’
or ‘an official’. Your role is randomly assigned to you and remains fixed throughout
the session . You will be anonymously and randomly assigned to a group of three
players: two firms and one official. The group will be fixed throughout the session
(Each group of 3 will consist of 2 firms and 1 official that will change every
round but the role will remain along the experiment) [only for ST]. Rounds are
independent, in the sense that the payoff consequences of decisions made in any
round do not carry over to subsequent rounds.
• Decision Making
In each round, all players receive an endowment of 10 ExCU1.
If you are a firm: You compete with the other firm of your group for the license
of a public project whose quality is beneficial to all players in the group. In each
round, you have to post bids on the quality of your project and a monetary transfer
which you wish to send privately to the official in your group if you are chosen to
undertake the project. Firms’ bids are made simultaneously, so that each firm can
only know its own bids, but not the bids of the other firm. If you win the auction,
apart from your round endowment, you earn a fixed extra profit. In that case, you
1Experimental Currency Unit.
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also have to spend on the transfer to the official double the amount you promised
in your bid. If you lose the auction, apart from your initial endowment from each
round, your earnings include a profit which is proportional to the quality of the
winning project.
If you are an official: In each round, you receive the bids from the firms in your
group. Then, you have to choose one of the two projects. Apart from your initial
endowment in this round, your earnings include a profit which is proportional to the
winner’s quality plus the amount, if any, privately transferred to you by the winner.
• Exact calculation of profits
From the description of strategies and earnings above, the specific formulas
used to calculate your profits in each round (π) are a function of the quality (Q)
and transfer (B) bids of the winner, as shown below:
πwinner = 10 +
1
2
·Qwinner + 10 − 2 ·Bwinner









If you are a firm: At the end of each round, you will receive information on
which firm won the license, a reminder of your decisions on quality level and trans-
fer in that round, as well as your profit for that round.
If you are an official: In each round, after firms have made their decisions,
their quality and transfer bids will be displayed on your screen before you make a
decision. Once you select the winning firm, you will receive information on your
profits in this round.
• Monetary rewards
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In order to determine your payment in the experiment, the computer will ran-
domly choose one of the 10 rounds at the end of the session. The amount of money
you will earn from this part of the experiment will be equal to your profits in the









behavior in an auction that
allows for corruption
4.1 Introduction
Corruption is regarded as one of the most detrimental factors that hindrance well
functioning economies in both the developed and the developing world. It has been
present during all times and has intruded all political systems. Trying to approx-
imate the monetary consequences of corruption is only half correct since the non
pecuniary costs of this distortion are equally harmful and are, most of the times,
missing from the recording attempts. A positive correlation exists between cor-
ruption and poverty and it seems to rise when countries are suffering economical
problems. In addition, the existence of corruption creates both an unhealthy eco-
nomic and social environment as it is closely connected with the ethical and moral
values of humanity. For economists, reducing corruption is a target that has not
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been accomplished yet. In fact, it is difficult since positive as well as negative ef-
fects have been found. On the one hand, we find those researches that demonstrate
the positive effects of corruption. The general claim is that corruption enhances
efficiency as it corrects some public sector fails and it ‘greases the wheels’ of the
economy (Egger and Winner, 2005; Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Lui, 1986). On
the other hand, others authors rather believe that corruption is the cause of ineffi-
ciency (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Empirical researches have been addressed to sup-
port the negative consequences of corruption as Mauro (1995) who demonstrates
how corruption decreases growth. Gupta et al. (2002) display the negative effects
of corruption on inequality and poverty. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find
evidence that corruption is lower when the public employees’ wages are high rel-
ative to those of the manufacturing sector. Dollar et al. (2001) associate a higher
representation of women in the parliament with lower corruption.
Measuring corruption is a big challenge as far as data are not observable. Rather
most of empirical researches are based on subjective surveys.1 We believe exper-
imental economics is a useful methodology in order to study some complicated
areas, as is the case of corruption or tax evasion among others. It allows us to
investigate the personal behavior towards bribery and specific patterns around it
according to the specific characteristic the researcher is interested to capture. Ex-
periments have been used to test the effect and usefulness of some policies in the
sense of changing institutional context. For instance the effect of monitoring in a
basic bribery scenario (Abbink et al., 2002; Schulze and Frank, 2003) and different
types of monitoring (Serra, 2012), the different matching protocols testing the inter-
action system between agents (Abbink, 2004), varying wages (Abbink et al., 2002;
Azfar and Nelson, 2007) and an institutional legal system which protects bribe
givers (Abbink et al., 2014). Other studies focus on the characteristics that could
encourage a bribing behavior, as subjects’ background, culture, and gender (Al-
atas et al., 2009a,b; Banuri and Eckel, 2012; Barr and Serra, 2010; Cameron et al.,
2009; Frank et al., 2010; Frank and Schulze, 2000). Hence, we firmly believe in
1Transparency International publishes annually the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which
ranks countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and
opinion surveys. Surveys/assessments are either business people opinion surveys or performance
assessments from a group of analysts.
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the emergency of studying the idiosyncratic factors explaining bribing propensity,
and the mechanisms that could encourage/deter bribing, as well.
Based on the same framework used in the previous chapter, we aim at studying,
on a bribery context, the effect of affecting two dimensions: people’s extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation. First, we add a new institution which permits the losing firm of
an auction for a public project, to inspect whether the wining firm and the auction-
eer (as a public official), were involved in some corrupt transactions. If any bribe
was offered by the firm and finally accepted by the public official, the inspection
institution is in charge of automatically sanctioning both. This institution allows
us to study the effect of activating the extrinsic motivation on subjects. Second,
we add a new player called the ‘citizen’ as an observer and passive receiver of the
potentially corrupt transactions. We expect that this mechanism activates people’s
intrinsic motivation.
In addition, our experimental implementation design was carefully though in order
to run 4 treatments in just one session permitting us to perform both, a between and
a within subjects analysis and to control for any slight difference among treatments.
Starting from a determined basic institutional environment we add the new institu-
tions one over the other and we calibrate exactly the impact of each one separately,
and combining both. This design allows us to disentangle whether the intrinsic mo-
tivation of subjects that play as firms and officials is activated just by the presence
of the ‘citizen’ or because they are aware that their decisions determine citizens’
earnings.
The two aforementioned dimensions of people have been already studied on sev-
eral experiments on corruption. Although inspired by the work of Abbink et al.
(2014), in which people’s extrinsic motivation is activated through ‘reporting’ and
Barr and Serra (2009), in which the intrinsic plane is activated through a negative
externality produced by bribery on passive players, our design permits to capture
some features that others can not.
To summarize the aim of this chapter, we enumerate the main questions we try
to answer:
1. We test the effect of activating the extrinsic motivation of people by incor-
porating a new institution permitting the losing firm of the auction to call for
inspection.
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2. We test the effect of activating the intrinsic motivation of people by incor-
porating a passive player affected by the potentially corrupt transactions. We
disentangle the effect of the passive player as just an observer from the effect
of this player as an observer and affected player.
3. We seek a pattern of characteristics of bribers such as gender and risk atti-
tudes.
4. We use a novel design where 4 treatments were run in one experimental ses-
sion.
In the following section we provide a deep literature review related with our ob-
jective. In section 4.3 we briefly describe the experimental design and discuss the
methodology followed in this study. Section 4.4 is dedicated to show the results in
detail. We provide in section 4.5 the main conclusions of this chapter.
4.2 Related Literature
It is well known among researchers that attempting to study corruption is a difficult
task as many are the barriers and lacks of information around this important phe-
nomenon. We use the experimental methodology as a well-fit approach to analyze
how a person who is disposed to bribe can be influenced using both, extrinsic and
intrinsic motivations. We therefore consider that a way to activate the extrinsic mo-
tivation of human being could be an exogenous mechanism that threats punishing
those people who are caught bribing.
4.2.1 Literature on extrinsic motivation
In our experiment, the extrinsic motivation is activated through an inspection op-
tion available for the loser firm of an auction which allows for bribing. By extrinsic
motivation we refer to any external factor that can affect subjects’ behavior. We
believe that this implementation is closely related to the ‘punishment’ literature.
Experimental economists have broadly studied punishment and its effects in hu-
man behavior. Although it has been studied in many contexts, the most common
framework is the public good games. Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002) inspired many
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researchers as they demonstrate how, even if punishment is costly, it is frequently
used and has effective results in terms of reducing free-riding and, hence, increas-
ing cooperation.
Our interest is punishment in a large sense, i.e. any action (threat, punishment,
inspection) from a player that is addressed to discourage other players of deviating
from the social norm. Specifically, the social norm we are interested in is the one
that subjects consider as ethics.
A set of experiments on corruption are those in Alatas et al. (2009a,b) or Cameron
et al. (2009) who implemented a common design, consisting of a bribery one-shot
game among a firm (not) offering a bribe, an official (not) accepting the bribe and
a citizen who does (not) punish both the other two agents at a cost. Punishment is
mainly used to measure the level of tolerance towards corruption.
Reporting behavior has been deeply studied by Abbink et al. (2014) who test the
validity of Basu’s (2011) theory, claiming that legal immunity for bribe-giver could
encourage reporting officials for demanding bribes. The authors conducted an ex-
periment representing the situation in which a public official asks for a bribe to a
citizen, in exchange of a good or service he is obliged to provide. This is what
the authors consider ‘harassment bribes’. The purpose of the work is to compare
the situation in which bribe-giver and bribe-taker are equally guilty when caught,
with the situation in which just the bribe-taker is guilty. The former corresponds
to ‘symmetric liability’ and is used as a baseline. The later corresponds to ‘asym-
metric liability’ and just the official is punished if caught. The authors find that
the immunity for bribe-givers increases the propensity to report, and decreases the
propensity to demand bribes from officials. Interestingly, when bribes are not re-
fund to the citizens after reporting, a minority of citizens refuse to pay bribes sug-
gesting that this behavior comes from intrinsic motivations rather than economical
ones.
Our work is somehow related to the aforementioned one, as we also study the effect
of reporting, but we prefer to use the term ‘inspection’. Differently from Abbink
et al. (2014) we study the effect of adding an inspection option to the loser firm
in the framework of a public auction. We share the authors’ opinion that is not
realistic that a citizen could punish the corrupt agents, specially in our public auc-
tion context. We thus believe that their are only two ways to punish corrupt people.
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Either, they are caught by the responsible authorities, or they are reported/inspected
internally by one of the agents participating in the corrupt interaction. Countries
with high level of corruption, generally lack a reliable monitoring institutional sys-
tem. Hence, giving the opportunity to one of the affected agents by corruption to
call for inspection may be a more efficient solution. However, differently from
Abbink et al. (2014) we believe that in the context of public procurement auc-
tions, inspections are more plausible because companies have more political and
economical power to report than citizens. Our design, however, does not permit to
disentangle the intrinsic from the extrinsic motivation of reporting as Abbink et al.’s
(2014) design. In our work, we are rather more interested on studying the effect of
activating the extrinsic motivation through the threat of an inspection, made by the
losing firm, which is completely irrational from an economical point of view as the
theoretical prediction suggest that no inspection is activated on equilibrium.
The whistle-blowing mechanism has been also studied in other framework as anti-
trust policies by Apesteguia and Dufwenberg (2007) and Bigoni et al. (2012).
Inspired by all these studies, our design introduces an inspection mechanism allow-
ing to highly activate the extrinsic motivations of participants.
4.2.2 Literature on intrinsic motivation
We are also interested in the effect of activating subjects’ intrinsic motivation to
behave in a more pro-social way by abstaining more often from bribery. We con-
sider intrinsic motivations as those different from the pure monetary interest. This
aspect has also been studied in many fields and from different perspectives.
For instance, a participant playing as dictator in a dictator game giving any pos-
itive amount of money reveals altruistic motivation. Many researches in experi-
mental economics demonstrate that subjects are altruistic even in anonymous con-
texts (Andreoni et al., 2007; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Andreoni and Vesterlund,
2001; Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Forsythe et al., 1994; Harbaugh et al., 2007;
Vesterlund, 2006). This feature is enhanced when manipulating the social distance
between giver and receiver, in the sense of the giver knowing some information
about the receiver, they become more willing to give. For example, if the giver sees
the receivers or know just their name or a characteristic of them, the amount given
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in a dictator game is higher (Bohnet and Frey, 1999).
Other experimental techniques have an effect on increasing cooperative behavior.
Interestingly, the watching eyes manipulation affects contributions in a public good
game. A field experiment where a pair of eyes is displayed on a honesty box makes
people pay triple than in a baseline (Bateson et al., 2006). Furthermore in MIT, a
robot with eyes on subjects’ computer screen yields an increase on subjects’ con-
tributions in a public good game (Burnham and Hare, 2007), and this can not be
explained by standard economic theory. The watching-eyes manipulation works al-
most systematically as a way of increasing contributions. In fact, Burnham (2003),
Haley and Fessler (2005), Rigdon et al. (2009) show that three dots are sufficient
to increase giving in dictator game. Mifune et al. (2010) used the same stimuli
as Haley and Fessler (2005) and showed that the eyes effect in the dictator game
is working just when the giver perceives that the receiver belongs to the same in-
group than himself. Thus, just the physical presence of other people in the room or
non-verbal cues are provoking an increase on contributions. More experiments on
this topic are Andreoni and Petrie (2004), Hoffman et al. (1994), Kurzban (2001).
However, some examples can be found where the watching-eyes or the physical
presence have no effect on decisions. Lamba and Mace (2010) showed that pres-
ence of other people when playing ultimatum game do not change the behavior.
In other context in which there is reciprocity, Fehr and Schneider (2010) found that
the eyes images on the computer screen (the watching eyes manipulation) had no
effect on the second player of a trust game.
Considering that just the presence of someone watching you can affect decisions,
our design was thought accurately to disentangle whether an increase on pro-social
behavior is due to an observer player from an observer and affected player.
Several experiments on corruption include an externality effect, meaning that other
people of the society are negatively affected by corruption. Abbink et al. (2002)
run a bribery game in which a potential briber and a bribee interact. The briber
decides whether and how much bribe offers to the bribee. The bribee has the op-
tion to accept or to reject the bribe. In the ‘negative externality treatment’, when a
bribe was offered and reciprocated by the bribee, all the other players in the same
session incurred a loss. This manipulation allows the authors to study the effect of
the negative externality provoked by bribery in others members of the society. No
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effect was found from this treatment.
Alatas et al. (2009a,b), Cameron et al. (2009), based on the same design, represent
the situation in which a public official and a firm interact on a potential bribery
exchange. If a bribe is offered by the firm and accepted by the official, then a third
player, a citizen, is affected by the negative externality, yielding to a reduction on
his payoff. In the final stage, the citizen has the option to punish the corrupt agents,
at a cost.
Barr and Serra (2009) use a new design to represent a ‘petty corruption’ scenario.1
This design consist of a one-shot game involving a citizen who may pay a bribe to
an official having the option to accept or reject, and ‘other members of society’ who
incur a cost for every bribe offered and accepted by two potentially corrupt agents.
The authors analyze the impact of framing and the effect of variating the level of
the negative externality produced by bribery on ‘other members of society’. They
find that combining framed instructions with high negative externalities on ‘other
members of society’ reduce the offers of bribe made by citizens. However, when
just either frame or high externality are present, the offers tend to increase. Officials
are more willing to reject bribes when there is no frame and with high externalities.
They do not find a framing effect. We hence believe that this interesting work is
closely related to ours, mainly in the externality feature. Usually designs involving
a passive receiver treatment do not distinguish between the effect of being observed
and main decisions affecting a passive player, because the two features are intro-
duced simultaneously as Barr and Serra (2009). However, in our work we compare
unaffected observers of the decisions versus influenced observers by the external-
ity. Thus, our design allows to disentangle whether firms and officials’ decisions
are affected by the mere presence of the passive players observing them or because
they are aware that their decisions are influencing the observer. In Barr and Serra
(2009), the passive players are composed by groups of 5 members equally affected
by the externality of 5 pairs firms and citizens, whereas in our design, each passive
player is affected by each triplet of 2 firms and 1 official, in order to avoid in-
terdependence among decisions. Their design corresponds to a ‘petty corruption’
scenario where a citizen offers a bribe to an official. We believe, that corrupt public
auctions are really engendering negative externalities on society. Differently from
1This design has been replicated by Barr and Serra (2010) and Serra (2012) among others.
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Barr and Serra (2009), we do not look for a framing effect in our work.
Our experimental design includes passive observer players who are also victims of
the potentially corrupt transactions.
4.3 Experimental Design
4.3.1 Theoretical Framework
Our baseline game is equivalent to the one explained in chapter 3. We have ap-
plied the restriction Q + B ≤ A for each firm-subject’s strategies, reflecting the
trade-off between quality and bribe. We have used the parameter set (F, a, c, A,
R)=(10, 1
2
, 2, 10, 10). Taking this payoff structure into account, implying that
agents care only for the monetary consequences of their actions and assuming a
continuous strategy space, the unique Nash equilibrium is such that both firms’
bids involve (Q,B) = (5, 5). That is, like in Bertrand competition, in equilibrium
firms will be willing to spend on the bribe as much as the bonus they obtain from
winning the auction. However, for simplicity, our experiment is run with a discrete
strategy space, allowing only for integer quality and bribe bids. Then, multiple
equilibria emerge including (Q,B) = (7, 3) and (Q,B) = (6, 4). In this case,
the unique continuous-strategy equilibrium (Q,B) = (5, 5) becomes a weak equi-
librium, since each firm is indifferent between this and posting lower bribes, then
becoming a loser (with a 12.5 units payoff in both cases).1
In this chapter the novelty is the inspection treatment, which includes a new stage
after the officials’ decisions, allowing to highly activate the extrinsic motivations
of participants. We expect that the impact of this inspection mechanism is going to
be high, despite the low frequency of using it. In our design the loser firm of the
license has the option to inspect the official and the winner firm. The inspecting
firm has not a direct cost but incurs in the risk of losing all her payoffs if its in-
spection is wrong. In real life such a policy would be costless for the government
if the cost for the legal prosecution of a suspicious public project would burden
any company that initiated such a procedure. In our experiment the risk faced by
the losing firm (being punished with a zero payoff) if the lawsuit does not reveal
1The theoretical model and its predictions are developed in chapter 2.
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any money transfer, simulates the cost that a company in real life would have to
suffer to initiate a legal prosecution. In fact, an extreme version of the inspection
mechanism is chosen. Inspection is a dominated strategy whose expected payoff
is negative. Thus, in equilibrium no inspection is expected and equlibria do not
change with respect to the baseline treatment.
4.3.2 Procedures
The session was conducted in the Laboratorio de Economı́a Experimental (LEE) at
the University Jaume I.1 The average earnings were 19.60 euros per subject. The
participants were recruited using ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004) from a pool of
students, with majority of economics students. We recruited 77 subjects, 66 of
them would be given the role of either firm or official, and the 11 remaining would
participate in the game as citizens. Our design allowed us to run 4 treatments in
one session.2
In our study we also measure also risk attitudes as a subject’s willingness to choose
a riskier option among a number of winning probability and prize pairs. Here,
we adopt two lottery tests, firstly introduced by Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis
(2002) from which we can extract subjects’ risk aversion and risk aversion with
losses level.3 We also collected some other information about the subjects like
their age and gender.
4.3.2.1 Treatments
Four treatments were run in one session. A total of 66 subjects were grouped into
two groups (group 1 & group 2) of 33 subjects each one.
Treatment B was run with group 1 and subjects play the baseline game for 15 peri-
ods. We divide the 33 subjects of group 1 into 11 markets. In each market, there are
two firms and one official. We informed the 11 markets of group 1 that the amount
each firm places for quality, as well as the winner of each round are going to be
1The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
2Instructions are provided in appendix 4.6.
3Risk aversion lotteries played by subjects are provided in appendix 4.7. From figure 4.11 we
extract subjects’ risk aversion and from figure 4.12 we extract subjects’ risk aversion with losses.
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shown in a monitor to a group of 11 citizens that observe the decision-making of
the experiment from next room. Specifically, the room in which citizens are seated
is separated by just a glass. So that citizens could perfectly see firms and officials
decision making during the session. We denote these citizens as observe-only cit-
izens.
In treatment C, we divide the players of group 2 in 11 markets, following exactly
the same procedures as in treatment B. The only difference is that in treatment C
the firms and the officials are informed that the outcome of each round is affecting
the payoff of the citizens. Explicitly, they are informed that there is one citizen for
each market and that citizens’ payoffs for each round will be exactly the quality
placed by the winning firm. We denote these citizens as affected citizens.1
The comparison between treatment B and C allows us to investigate any impact that
the externality might have on the placement of bribery and, eventually, on quality.
The feature of a citizen as a passive receiver of the quality of the public project
tries to illustrate how firms and officials can be affected by their awareness that
their decisions may affect social welfare. The design also permits to seclude, on
firms and officials, the effect of being observed from the effect of affecting other
people’s payoffs.
In the end of round 15 we gave new roles to the 33 subjects of group 1 and 2, so
now 11 new markets of firms and officials emerged for each group while still the 11
citizen players observe through a monitor the evolution of the game. Continuing
the same structure and scenario as the previous treatments, we now insert a new
option for the firms. After each auction has been resolved by the auctioneer, the
loser firm can activate the inspection option to reveal a possible bribe. A revealed
bribe leads both players involved to the loss of their period earnings, whereas, if
no bribe is revealed, the denouncing firm loses all its period profits instead. The
option is available to the losing firm either it has placed a bribe or not. Hence, from
round 16 to round 30, group 1 played treatment Bi and group 2 played treatment
Ci. To summarize, treatment Bi and Ci replicate the same conditions concerning
the citizens as in treatment B and C respectively, but including the inspection op-
tion for the loser firm.
1Note that observe-only citizens and affected citizens are the same subjects but they have a
different role for each group.
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From this session we get a sample from which we could do a between subjects and
within subjects analysis. Table 4.1 summarize the features containing each treat-
ment.1
no-inspection inspection
Period 1 to 15 16 to 30
observe-only citizen Treatment B (Group 1) Treatment Bi (Group 1)
affected citizen Treatment C (Group 2) Treatment Ci (Group 2)
Table 4.1: Summary of treatments.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 The sample
The sample is composed of 66 people (mean age: 23, st. dev.: 2.9) playing as
firm and official, 33 of whom were women and 33 men. The sample is perfectly
balanced among gender, by treatment and by the role played.2 Concerning firms,
in each treatment the share-out was equal (11 men, and 11 women). Concerning
officials, the sample was almost balanced: 6 men (and 5 women) played as officials
in treatment B and Bi, and 5 men (and 6 women) played as officials in treatment C
and Ci.
4.4.2 Treatment effects
In this section we test for differences among treatments. In order to organize the
exposure of the results, some of the analyses will be performed by gathering treat-
ments in couples. Specifically, no-inspection treatments gather treatments B & C,
inspection treatments gather treatments Bi & Ci, observe-only treatments gather
1A croquis of the laboratory is provided in appendix 4.8.
2Actually, 11 more participants play as citizens, who are passive players not taking decisions.
Thus, an amount of 77 subjects participate in this experiment. We do not include the 11 citizens in
our analysis as no decisions were taken by them.
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treatments B & Bi, and affected treatments gather treatments C & Ci. The pur-
pose of this arrangement is to study the net effect of some of the manipulations, by
omitting the features we are not interested in.
4.4.2.1 The citizen
The citizen is a passive player, it is not a decision-taker but, it is just observing and
being affected by the decisions of firms and officials. The fact that the decisions
of the market agents (firms and officials) can affect the citizens’ payoffs can be
interpreted as the activation of the intrinsic motivation of people. For this purpose,
we conduct a between subjects analysis by comparing, individually, treatment B vs
treatment C and treatment Bi vs treatment Ci. We also compare observe-only treat-
ments vs affected treatments in order to study the pure effect of citizen, omitting
the inspection effect.
4.4.2.1.1 Firms
Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 illustrate the effect produced by citizens on firms’ bribe de-
cisions. In general terms, we observe lower bribe bids and consequently higher
quality bids when the citizen is affected by others’ decisions with respect to observe-
only citizens. Figure 4.1 presents the evolution of bribe averages over time. In the
treatments where the citizen is an affected citizen (C & Ci) the curve is in the ma-
jority of periods below the one where the citizen is an observe-only citizen (B &
Bi). In fact, the average bribe offered in treatment C is significantly lower than in
treatment B. Likewise, the average bribe is significantly lower in treatment Ci than
in treatment Bi.1
Figure 4.2 supports the previous result by displaying the distribution of bribe
for each treatment. In this figure we underline the increase of the zero-bribe of-
fers, produced by the effect of citizen. In treatment B just 1.82% of bribe offers
were null, however this percentage increased up to 12.42% in treatment C, with
1Henceforth, table 4.2 displays the bribe average bids for each treatment. Table 4.3 displays
the corresponding non parametric test to compare treatment effects. In particular, Mann-Withney
corresponds to Wilcoxon Mann-Withney rank sum test. Kolm.-Smir. corresponds to Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. Wilcoxon corresponds to Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test.
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Figure 4.1: The evolution of bribe
Treatment B Bi C Ci
Bribe 3.03 1.20 2.59 0.77
standard deviation 1.26 1.81 1.61 1.97
Table 4.2: Average bribe offers.
significantly different distributions. In treatment Bi, 63.33% of offers of bribe were
zero vs 82.12% in treatment Ci, with significantly different distributions (table 4.3:
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).
Figure 4.3 presents the distribution of bribe, comparing observe-only treatments
with affected treatments. Again, there is an increase on the percentage of decisions
of offering zero bribes when the citizen is economically affected by the others’
decisions. A 32.58% of offers of bribe are null when citizen are just observers and
47.27% when citizens are observers and receivers. Hence, omitting the inspection
condition, we find statistically significant differences on distributions for the net
effect of citizens (table 4.3: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). Firms are more frequently
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Treatments Mann-Withney Kolm.-Smir. Wilcoxon
z p D p z p
B vs C 3.24 0.00 0.20 0.00
Bi vs Ci 4.89 0.00 0.19 0.00
[observe-only] vs [affected] -5.76 0.00 0.18 0.00
B vs Bi 0.61 0.00 9.33 0.00
C vs Ci 0.70 0.00 11.24 0.00
[no-inspection] vs [inspection] 0.66 0.00 31.83 0.00
Table 4.3: Non parametrics tests for a comparison among treatments.
Figure 4.2: The distribution of the bribe, by treatment
abstaining from bribing when the citizen is affected by their decisions.
4.4.2.1.2 Officials
We distinguish two patterns of decisions made by officials revealing their prefer-
ences: bribe maximizing decisions and quality maximizing decisions (we discard
ties for the analysis of officials). Figure 4.4 illustrates the effect of each treatment
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Figure 4.3: Net effect of the citizen on bribe
on the officials’ preferences. In treatment B, a 82.91% of decisions are made ac-
cording to maximizing bribe while in treatment C these decisions are 91.43%. We
find statistically significant differences (χ2=3.54, p=0.06). In treatment Bi, 26.73%
of decisions are bribe maximizers and in treatment Ci, this is true for 19.30% of
decisions (χ2=1.10, p=0.29). These results suggest that the affected citizen is not
playing any significant influence on officials. In other words, contrary to firms, of-
ficials are not exhibiting a more pro-social behavior when they are aware that their
decisions are determining citizens’ payoffs.
To conclude this section, we have reviewed the behavior of firms and officials
focusing on the net effect produced by the presence of the citizen. We compare
treatments in which the citizen is just observing the decisions of the ‘society’ with
treatments in which the citizen is positively affected by the amount of quality in-
vested in the winning project. We see a significant effect on firms’ decisions as far
as bribe bids decrease (and consequently quality bids increase). Despite that cit-
izens are passive players, the fact of being affected by others’ decisions activates an
intrinsic-altruistic motivation on firms by raising the offers of quality to officials.
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Figure 4.4: Official’s preferences: differences among treatments
However, the presence of citizens affected by their decisions is not activating any
empathy from officials. Our design has permitted to disentangle and understand
that the decrease on bribe bids (and consequently an increase on quality bids) from
firms, is due to the activation of an altruistic-intrinsic side of people, rather than
just the shame of being observed.
4.4.2.2 Inspection option
In this section, we describe the effect produced by the activation of the extrinsic
motivation of subjects by adding a new institution which affects firms and officials’
payoffs. After being informed of the official’s decision, the loser firm has the option
to call for an inspection to the project assignation. A revealed bribe leads both
players involved to the loss of their period earnings, whereas, if no bribe is revealed,
the inspecting firm loses all its period profits instead.
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4.4.2.2.1 Firms
Figures 4.2, 4.5 and 4.6 illustrate the effect of the inspection institution, on firms’
decisions on bribe. There is a straightforward decrease of bribe offers when the
inspection threat is present. Figure 4.5 shows the evolution of the average bribe
along the 30 periods. We observe a dramatical and significant effect on bribe bids
from firms: in fact, the average bribe is 2.72 units (st. dev.: 1.63) for the first 15
periods (no-inspection treatments) and 0.88 units (st. dev.: 1.72) for the last 15
periods (inspection treatments). As seen on table 4.3 all the differences are statist-
ically significant1.
Figure 4.5: The evolution of bribe: Inspection effect.
Again, figure 4.2 confirms the effect of inspection in the distribution of bribe.
1In order to perform Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test statistical analysis, our sample
became lower as we compare firm-subjects’ decisions in the first 15 periods with the last 15 periods.
At the end of period 15 a rematching of groups composition and roles was done. We could hence,
just analyze those subjects who played as firm in the first part of the experiment and in the second
part as well. Thus, considering this condition we have a sample of 13 subjects for B & Bi and 17
subjects for C & Ci.
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We highlight the huge increase of the zero-bribe offers, becoming the modal, pro-
duced by the effect of inspection. We find 1.82% in treatment B versus 63.33%
in treatment Bi of zero-bribe offers, with significantly different distributions (table
4.3).
Figure 4.6 compares no-inspection treatments vs inspection treatments. This
arrangement is done in order to seclude the pure effect of inspection (independ-
ently of the citizen feature). This figure shows clearly the dramatical effect of the
inspection threat on bribe offers. We observe a huge increase of non-bribe offers.
When inspection was not available, 7.12% of offers were abstaining from bribe,
however after the inspection option is available, this result is true in 72.73% of the
offers. We find statistically significant differences for the net effect of the inspec-
tion feature (table 4.3).
Figure 4.6: Net effect of inspection on bribe
Figure 4.7 give us an overview of the inspection pattern, concretely the evolu-
tion of the frequency of inspecting by period. We observe a clear decrease on the
propensity to inspect over time. Although in the first period 72.73% of the loser
firms decide to inspect, just a 4.55% called for inspection in last period.
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In addition, from the total amount of inspections, 25% were right, that is,
the winning firm and official were captured as corrupts (75% of inspections were
wrong, thus loser firms should pay for inspecting). Moreover, we study the profile
of firms deciding to inspect. Interestingly, in a 36.25% (N=29/80) of cases the loser
firm called for inspection while its bribe offer was superior to the bribe offered by
the winning firm, whereas in a 21.25% (N=17/80) of the cases was inferior. In a
42.50% (N=34/80) of the cases the bribe offers were equal. Hence, a significantly
higher percentage (χ2=5.92, p=0.01) of loser firms decides to inspect even though
they offered a higher bribe than the winning firm.
Figure 4.7: The evolution of inspecting.
4.4.2.2.2 Officials
From figure 4.4 we can extract the effect of inspection on officials. In treatment B,
82.91% of the decisions correspond to the bribe maximization whereas in treatment
Bi there is a reversal on preferences as just 26.73% of decisions are made according
to bribe, thus against the monetary maximization (χ2=60.74, p=0.00). In treatment
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C, 91.43% of decisions are made according to bribe while in treatment Ci this is
true just in 19.30% of the cases (χ2=85.72, p=0.01).
In this section we explored the effect of the inspection institution on subjects
as firms and officials. We observe a straightforward effect on both kind of players
in the sense that firm-subjects decrease drastically their bribe bids and official-
subjects exhibit a reversal on their preferences as the majority of their decisions
become pro-social since the inspection option is present. We also observe that the
inspection threat is creating a huge effect, although the frequency of losing firms
actually calling for inspection almost disappears over time. More interestingly, we
do not observe a ‘fair’ way of inspecting, rather high percentage of ‘corrupt’ loser
firms activate the inspection button.
4.4.2.3 Social welfare
In this section we calculate the effect of each treatment in terms of social welfare.
We measure social welfare as the total profits of each group. Thus, for any group




i , where w= winner firm, l= loser firm, and o= official.
Figure 4.8 represents the evolution of the average of the groups’ profits for each
treatment, by period. In treatments Bi and Ci, social welfare starts at lower levels
with 36.27 units and 35.83 units respectively than in treatments B and C with 46.50
units and 46.55 units respectively. However, the efficiency tend to increase over
time and the social welfare of treatments with inspection overtakes those without
inspection. The average social welfare for all periods in treatment B is 46.23 units,
in treatment Bi is 46.71 units, in treatment C is 47.10 units and finally 51.13 units
in treatment Ci. All the differences are statistically significant (see table 4.4).
Treatments B vs C B vs Bi C vs Ci Bi vs Ci B vs Ci C vs Bi
Mann-Whitney test (Z) 2.35 8.14 -5.76 -7.54 18.05 6.32
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4.4: Mann-Withney rank-sum tests for comparison of social welfare among
treatments.
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Figure 4.8: The evolution of the efficiency of groups, by treatment.
From these results we conclude that new institutions are improving the social
welfare. The citizen as a passive receiver of society increase the groups’ profits
more than inspection alone, whereas the combination of both yields to the highest
social welfare. However, the introduction of the inspection option needs a time to
reach its highest point. It seems that the activation of the intrinsic motivation of
people, alone, is yielding to a higher social welfare than the activation of just the
extrinsic motivation.
4.4.3 Idiosyncratic features
This section is addressed to understand the personal characteristics of people that
may help to explain some preferences related to bribe. We study, separately, the
effect of gender and risk aversion on bribery.
4.4.3.1 Gender
This section studies the differences on gender behavior towards bribery. Figure
4.9 represents the evolution of the average bribe per period for women and men
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along the whole experiment. We compare no-inspection treatments with inspection
treatments. This figure does not give a straightforward picture showing differences
among gender. In fact, no significant differences appear in the no-inspection treat-
ments, with men offering 2.69 units of bribe and women 2.93 units1, however in
inspection treatments, men’s average bribe is 0.83 units and women’s 1.15 units,
with significant differences2. In the full experiment, women (2.04 units) offer sig-
nificantly higher amounts of bribe than men (1.76 units)3.
Figure 4.9: The evolution of bribe, by gender.
We do not find significant differences on the frequency of inspecting for women
and men. Men loser-firms activated the inspection 23.57% of times and women
loser-firms, 24.72% of times (χ2=0.06, p=0.81).
Table 4.5 shows the percentage of quality maximizing decisions made by official-
subjects, comparing gender within each treatment. In no-inspection treatments, we
observe a similar behavior between both genders: in treatment B, 17% of decisions
1Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney z=-1.37, p=0.17.
2Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney z=-3.19, p=0.00.
3Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney z=-3.05, p=0.00.
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made by men and 18% made by women exhibit a pro-social behavior and in treat-
ment C the same is true for 10% and 7% respectively. No significant differences
are found. However, in inspection treatments some differences appear: in treat-
ment Bi, official-men made significantly more quality maximizing decisions than
women (81% versus 65%) whereas the contrary occurs in Ci with 71% of men de-
ciding according to quality versus 86% of women, with no statistically significant
differences.
Treatment B Bi C Ci
Men 17% 81% 10% 71%
Women 18% 65% 7% 86%
χ2 0.02 3.08 0.25 1.83
p-value 0.89 0.08 0.62 0.17
Table 4.5: Quality maximizing decisions comparing gender within treatments and the
corresponding values for χ2 test.
In conclusion, we find women offer significantly higher bribe than men when
the inspection is available, whereas no significant differences appear when inspec-
tion is not possible. No significant differences are found in gender in the propensity
to inspect. Men in the role of official exhibit significantly a higher pro-social be-
havior than women when inspection is available and the citizen is just observer
whereas women are more pro-social when inspection is available and the citizen is
affected by others’ decisions, although this difference is not significant. No more
significant differences are found in gender for official-subjects.
These results seem to be in the opposite direction of the existent literature as, gener-
ally speaking, most of studies found women bribe less (Alatas et al., 2009a; Rivas,
2013; Schulze and Frank, 2003) and behave more pro-socially. However, no strik-
ing conclusions can be extracted from gender and corruption. We believe that the
study of gender should go with the study of culture as the idiosyncrasy of each
society determines the features of gender attitudes. In addition, an accurate study
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of gender should demand to inform subjects about the gender of the other group
members, as for instance, Rivas (2013).1
4.4.3.2 Risk Aversion
We distinguish risk aversion lotteries where no losses are possible, from risk aver-
sion with losses (Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis, 2002). Both samples follow a
normal distribution where decisions are concentrated around a probability of 0.5.
For each subject we calculate his average risk aversion level for all lotteries. We
classify from now on high risk averse subjects as those choosing on average a prob-
ability strictly higher than 0.5, and low risk averse those with probability strictly
lower than 0.5.
Figure 4.10 shows the evolution of bribe distinguishing between high risk averse
and low risk averse subjects for 30 periods. High risk averse subjects offer signi-
ficantly higher bribes on average (2.39 units) than low risk averse subjects (1.56
units)2. This result is consistent in no-inspection treatments, where high risk averse
subjects post an average of 2.91 units of bribe and low risk averse subjects post
an average of 2.74 units, although no significant differences are found3. In inspec-
tion treatments we observe a clear difference by high risk averse subjects posting
significantly higher bribes (1.77 units) than low risk averse subjects (0.53 units)4.
Risk aversion and corruption remains a topic to explore as few papers investig-
ate the relationship between risk and corruption. Berninghaus et al. (2013) expected
risk lovers choose the risky/corrupt option. However, the authors found that risk
attitude failed to explain subjects’ decisions between corrupt and non-corrupt and
claimed that beliefs are a better predictor than risk attitudes.
Our results rather than not finding a relation between risk and corruption show
a relation but in the opposite direction expected by Berninghaus et al. (2013). High
risk averse subjects are posting higher bribes as it increases their probability of
winning the license for the project. Furthermore, when inspection is available, this
1Actually gender is not the main purpose of this study, is just a note to understand better the
results of experiment. Hence, a deep review of gender and corruption can be found in Frank et al.
(2010) and Chaudhuri (2012).
2Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney z=-7.51, p=0.00.
3Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney z=-1.42, p=0.15.
4Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney z=-7.41, p=0.00.
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Figure 4.10: The evolution of bribe according to subjects’ risk aversion levels.
behavior remains, suggesting that high risk averse subjects are averse to the risk of
not winning the license, rather than the risk of being inspected. In our study we did
not consider the option to study beliefs which might be a good.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter explores many dimensions of bribery through the experimental meth-
odology. On the one hand, we evaluate the impact of incorporating new institutions
to a basic auction game with 2 firms and 1 official where bribes are permitted. On
the other hand, we seek personal characteristics of subjects explaining a propensity
to bribe or contrary, an aversion to bribe.
We first introduce an inspection option to the loser firm of the auction. If the invest-
igation reveals no bribe, the accusing firm loses all its profit, otherwise the accused
firm and official lose their profits. Despite the few times that the option is actually
used, bribes fall dramatically. We found a huge effect on the sense that it reduces
significantly bribe offers from firms, and bribe tolerance from officials. Thus, a
well-designed institution system threatening potentially corrupt people give us the
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hope of reducing bribery.
Second, we introduce another feature: a citizen who is a passive receiver of the
consequences of the potentially corrupt transaction. Our design give us an import-
ant hint as it permitted us to disentangle whether the effect of the citizen is due to
its net presence as observer, and thus creating shame on firms and officials, or by
the fact that citizens are activating an intrinsic altruism on people who know that
their decision are affecting others. It seems that firm-subjects are feeling a social
responsibility in the sense that they are bribing less when they are conscious that
their decisions affect other people. Official-subjects seem not to be affected by the
citizen. In terms of efficiency we found that groups’ profits are higher due to the
effect of the citizen alone than with just the inspection. The combination of both
yields to the highest levels of social welfare.
Moreover, we seek personal characteristics, thus in a pre-play session, we elicit
subjects’ risk preferences. We found a positive correlation between firm-subject’s
risk aversion and his/her posted bribery. During the 30 periods of the session, high
risk averse subjects posted higher bribes than low risk averse subjects, on average,
especially when the inspection is available. It seems that high risk averse subjects
feel the risk of losing the license rather than being inspected. Some results are
found in gender differences. Women posted higher bribes than men when inspec-
tion is available. In the role of official, the only statistically significant difference
found is in the treatment in which inspection is available and the citizen is just ob-
serving: men seem to behave in a more pro-social way than women.
Even though this chapter analyze many dimensions of bribery, we believe study-
ing corruption is a big challenge. We still having many questions to answer, for
instance, controlling for order-effect, or giving the opportunity to the official to
refuse bribes, among others further researches.
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4.6 Appendix: Instructions to experimental subjects
(translated from Spanish)
Welcome and thanks for your participation in this experiment. Please switch off
your mobile phones and secure your belongings away. You are going to participate
in an experimental session split into two subsessions of 15 rounds each. You will
earn an amount of money which will depend on your decisions and the decisions of
other participants in the session. From this moment onwards you must use only the
instructions and the computer in front of you. If you have any questions through-
out the session, please raise your hand and you will receive an answer by one of
the experimentalists. Any communication with other participants will imply your
immediate exclusion from the experiment.
4.6.1 [Treatment B] & [Treatment C] Subsession I
At the beginning of this subsession, you will be assigned one of two roles: ‘a firm’
or ‘an official’. Your role is randomly assigned to you and remains fixed throughout
the subsession. You will be anonymously and randomly assigned to a group of
three players: two firms and an official. The group will be fixed throughout the
subsession. Rounds are independent, in the sense that the payoff consequences of
decisions made in any round do not carry over to subsequent rounds. Once this
part is finished, the experimentalist will give you new instructions for the second
subsession.
• Decision Making
In each round, all players receive an endowment of 10 ExCU1.
If you are a firm: You compete with the other firm of your group for the license
of a public project whose quality is beneficial to all players in the group. In each
round, you have to post bids on the quality of your project and a monetary transfer
which you wish to send privately to the official in your group if you are chosen
to undertake the project. Firms’ bids are made simultaneously, so that each firm
can only know its own bids, but not the bids of the other firm. The quality and
1Experimental Currency Unit.
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the transfer to the official must sum 10, so that if your quality bid is 9 your trans-
fer to the official in case you win will be 1. If you win the auction, apart from
your round endowment, you earn a fixed extra profit. In that case, you also have to
spend on the transfer to the official double the amount you promised in your bid.
If you lose the auction, apart from your initial endowment from each round, your
earnings include a profit which is proportional to the quality of the winning project.
If you are an official: In each round, you receive the bids from the firms in your
group. Then, you have to choose one of the two projects. Apart from your initial
endowment in this round, your earnings include a profit which is proportional to the
winner’s quality plus the amount, if any, privately transferred to you by the winner.
If you are a citizen: You are not goint to take any decision. You are associated to
a group of 2 firms and 1 official. You will observe, on the screen in front of you,
the quality winning in each period and you will be paid according to the quality
winning in your corresponding group. Your earnings will be determined by a
random period, in the same way that all the participants in this session.1
• Exact calculation of profits
From the description of strategies and earnings above, the specific formulas
used to calculate your profits in each round (π) are a function of the quality (Q)
and transfer (B) bids of the winner, as shown below:
πwinner = 10 +
1
2
·Qwinner + 10 − 2 ·Bwinner









1Text in bold corresponds to the instructions’ specifications of treatments C and Ci.
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• Information received
If you are a firm: At the end of each round, you will receive information on
which firm won the license, a reminder of your decisions on quality level and trans-
fer in that round, as well as your profit for that round.
If you are an official: In each round, after firms have made their decisions, their
quality and transfer bids will be displayed on your screen before you make a de-
cision. Once you select the winning firm, you will receive information on your
profits in this round.
If you are a citizen: In each round, you will observe on the screen the quality
posted by the winning firm, in each group.
• Monetary rewards
In order to determine your payment in this subsession, the computer will ran-
domly choose one of the 15 rounds at the end of the session. The amount of money
you will earn from this part of the experiment will be equal to your profits in the
randomly chosen round, multiplied by an equivalence ratio of 1 ExCU = 1
2
Euro.
4.6.2 [Treatment Bi] & [Treatment Ci] Subsession II
In this subsession, the context will be exactly the same as in the first one, except
for the following:
The roles of subjects and the composition of groups will be re-determined ran-
domly and will remain fixed throughout the remaining rounds of the session.
A new feature is that, in each round, after the winner of the auction has been
determined by the official, the loser firm has the option to ask for an inspection of
the winning bid. The decision to inspect modifies the subjects’ earnings as follows:
If a transfer has taken place, the official and the winner of the auction earn nothing
in this round. On the contrary, if no transfer is revealed, then, the inspecting loser
earns nothing in this round. Finally, if no inspection is activated, players’ earnings
remain unchanged.
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• Monetary rewards
In order to determine your payment in this subsession, the computer will ran-
domly choose one of the 15 rounds at the end of the session. The amount of money
you will earn from this part of the experiment will be equal to your profits in the
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4.7 Appendix: Risk aversion tests
Welcome to the Laboratory of Experimental Economics (LEE). Before starting the
experiment you have to complete some tests. Please answer seriously to them.
Once all the participants have finish we can proceed to star the experiment.
Each one of the following ‘panels’ presents a serie of lotteries. Each lottery
consist of a probability of winning the prize below of it. You have to chose the
favorite lottery (example: in the Panel 1 you can choose to win 1.70 euros with a
probability of 0.6). This means that you can win 1.70 euros with a probability of
0.6 and nothing with a probability of 0.4. Remember, this is an hypothetical situ-
ation. It will not affect you real payoffs at the end of the experiment.
Figure 4.11: Risk aversion.
The instructions are similar to the previous one. Each probability consists of
the probability of winning the price below it. Now, in the case you are not winning
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the lottery, you would loose 1 euro. You have to choose you favorite lottery in each
panel.
Figure 4.12: Risk aversion with losses 2.
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4.8 Appendix: Croquis of the laboratory.
Figure 4.13: ‘Blue’ players represent citizens, ‘green’ players represent firm and of-
ficials playing treatments B and Bi, ‘red’ players represent firms and officials playing







A moral dilemma emerges when different motivations of human behavior dictate
opposite actions in a given decision-making context. In economic situations, the
most appealing type of dilemma concerns the conflict between selfish monetary
reward maximization and adherence to some ethical pro-social norm, especially
when the latter implies an economic loss. The emotional implications of such con-
flicts seem to originate, from the interplay between a basic impulse for greedy
money-seeking motivations and alternative, more sophisticated social and personal
ethical norms.1 In this chapter, we obtain behavioral data and emotional responses
by the participants in a laboratory experiment based on a moral dilemma designed
as a public procurement auction with the option of an anti-social bribe by the win-
ner of the auction to the auctioneer. Our results indicate that strong emotions are
associated with actions against monetary reward maximization, rather than with the
fulfillment or the violation of an ethical norm per se.
1As for example, in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
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Despite the broadly criticized reductionist construct of an emotionless utility-
maximizing machine known as Homo Oeconomicus, there is growing consensus
among economists that emotions matter in economic decisions. In everyday eco-
nomic transactions, people act according to intrinsic motivations and ethical stand-
ards, often against their pure economic interests. In fact, in many financial de-
cisions, non-economic motivations like a mother’s altruism or an activist’s ideo-
logy, may dominate economic motives. The basic research agenda aimed at ex-
plaining human behavior in the presence of conflicting motivations relies on models
assuming coexisting alternative objectives in the decision-maker’s utility function.
Two exceptions to this are Sen (1977) idea of economically costly commitments
to an ethical norm, and a much more recent approach allowing for potentially con-
flicting multiple selves (Gómez-Miñambres, 2014). While both the harmonic and
the conflictive approaches can potentially offer explanations for the behavior ob-
served in the presence of incompatible needs and alternatives, it is a major question
whether the conflict is perceived as such by the decision-maker or whether it is
internalized as a unified problem leading after all to the satisfaction of one’s own
needs and preferences. The former hypothesis would require accounting for the
conflict among opposite attractors of human behavior, potentially leading to emo-
tional arousal.
Several authors have addressed different aspects of corruption in a variety of ex-
perimental settings. Regarding the framework adopted, we can distinguish between
single-subject1 and multi-subject settings. Within the multi-subject paradigm, a
variation of which is also adopted in our study, several issues have been addressed,
like for example, the role of the matching protocol and the framing of the experi-
1For example, the studies by Frank and Schulze (2000); Schulze and Frank (2003)) use a single-
subject setting to address the issue of compliance to a rule in the context of a student film club in
the presence of probabilistic detection. The studies find that economics students are more propense




mental setup1, as well as the role of the subjects’ gender and culture2 or identity3.
Many studies seem to focus on mechanisms and institutions which could enhance
or mitigate corruption.4 Also related to our second treatment, Abbink et al. (2014)
report a bribery experiment run in India, including a whistle-blowing option. They
find that immunity for bribe givers reduces the propensity of bribe-takers to de-
mand bribes and increases the willingness to report, which is found to depend on
intrinsic motivations. Finally, a setup which has some similarities with our set-
ting is used by Gneezy et al. (2013), assuming a game involving two workers and
a referee, finding that when the referee keeps both workers’ bribes, the judgment
seems to be more motivated by the workers’ real performance. Despite similarities
with other settings, our framework is novel and yields interesting insights on the
emotional and behavioral aspects of corruption.
The literature on integral5 emotions associated with specific economic decisions
has focused both on the conflicts preceding the decision and on the feelings triggered
by feedback received after a decision is made. The existence of emotional arousal
1 Abbink (2004); Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006); Abbink et al. (2002) study a two stage-
two player game played between a potential briber and a bribee. If a bribe is sent and accepted,
respectively, a negative externality is experienced by other subjects in the session. The authors find
that less corruption is observed under a strangers matching protocol and that the framing of the
situation as bribery matters. The framing matters in the setup adopted by Lambsdorff and Frank
(2010, 2011), exposing subjects to an ultimatum game with endogenous framing of first movers’
offers as a bribe or a gift.
2Cameron et al. (2009) and Alatas et al. (2009a,b) consider a bribery game between a firm and a
public official. Decisions affect the contamination of a river, yielding a negative externality to other
players. Culture, gender and experience are shown to matter in this context. Recently, the effects of
culture and gender were revisited by Barr et al. (2009); Barr and Serra (2009) in a setup in which
the externality affects passive players (citizens). The role of citizens in cultural differences between
Pakistan and the US was investigated by Banuri and Eckel (2012) in a setup based on Abbink et al.
(2002).
3Based on a design by Azfar and Nelson (2007), focusing on the ease of corruption detection
and the effect of wages on bribes, Barr et al. (2009) study the role of framing and identities in an
experiment run in Ethiopia.
4For example, Serra (2012) inverts the usual timing of the underlying game, assuming that the
public official is the one who asks for a bribe and the citizen may accept paying it or not.
5As opposed to incidental emotions, which are not the effect but may cause to some extent
the decision. For discussion, see Peters et al. (2006). Examples can be found in Van Dijk and
Zeelenberg (2006) and Ariely and Loewenstein (2006).
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during economic decision-making has been confirmed by several studies1. In fact,
physiological measures of emotion, mostly skin conductance responses, have demon-
strated that decision-making may influence and be influenced by somatic markers
activated in bioregulatory processes2. We contribute to this literature using skin
conductance reactions to specific decisions and feedback from them. The frame-
work proposed involves a moral dilemma emerging in the presence of competing
motivations resulting from the contrast between selfish monetary reward maxim-
ization and pro-social attractors of individual action. Related to our approach,
Coricelli et al. (2010) and Coricelli et al. (2014) have established that economic
decisions involving some degree of conflict with ethics cause significant emotional
and, eventually, somatic reactions. The main conclusion seems to be that viola-
tions of specific pro-social norms is reflected on higher levels of arousal, which
was shown to relate to the emergence of negative self-reported emotions. Our re-
search extends this view by being the first to show that high emotional arousal may
also relate to ethical behavior when a specific decision is made against the purely
selfish motivation of monetary reward maximization.
5.2 Material & Methods
5.2.1 Theoretical framework
The framework studied here is inspired by Beck and Maher (1986); Burguet and
Che (2004); Che (1993); Lien (1986) and, especially, Büchner et al. (2008). We
explicitly introduce a tradeoff between bribe and quality bids. In the bidding stage,
two firms post simultaneously sealed quality bids and bribes to be paid in case
the bidder is the winner of the auction. In the final stage, on the basis of the bids
received, an official chooses one of the bids. The winner’s quality benefits all play-
ers, whereas the bribe is antisocial and inefficient, as it is paid at the cost of a lower
quality and an extra loss by the bribing winner. Thus, firms face a moral dilemma
in the sense that the higher a firm’s promised bribe, the more likely for the firm to
1Sanfey et al. (2003), Bechara (2004), Schwarz (2000) and Naqvi et al. (2006).
2Van ’t Wout et al. (2006), Crone et al. (2004), Bechara and Damasio (2005).
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be the winner of the auction. Also, officials face a dilemma, as their selfish pref-
erence for bids entailing higher bribes goes against the interest of all other players
and overall welfare.
In the experiment, we implement the following payoffs:
πofficial = F + a ·Qwinner +Bwinner (5.1)
πwinner = F + a ·Qwinner − c ·Bwinner +R (5.2)
πloser = F + a ·Qwinner (5.3)
where F is a fixed amount earned by each subject in each period, Q and B are,
respectively, the quality and bribe bids. R is the extra monetary reward earned
by the winner of the auction. Finally, a denotes the social return of the winning
project’s quality on each player’s utility and c the cost per monetary unit of bribe
transferred by the winner to the official. In order to limit the actions of firm-subjects
to pressing a single button, we have applied the restriction Q + B = A for each
firm-subject’s strategies, reflecting the trade-off between quality and bribes. We
have used the parameter set (F, a, c, A,R) = (10, 1
2
, 2, 10, 10).1
5.2.1.1 Monetary payoff equilibrium prediction
Taking this payoff structure into account, implying that agents care only for the
monetary consequences of their actions and assuming a continuous strategy space,
the unique Nash equilibrium is such that both firms’ bids involve (Q,B) =
(5, 5). That is, like in Bertrand competition, firms will be willing to spend on
the bribe as much as the bonus they obtain from winning the auction. How-
ever, as usual, our experiment is run with a discrete strategy space, allowing only
1The use of round numbers facilitates subjects’ calculations of the consequences of their ac-
tions.
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for integer quality and bribe bids. Then, multiple equilibria1 emerge including
(Q,B) = (7, 3) and (Q,B) = (6, 4). In this case, the unique continuous-
strategy equilibrium (Q,B) = (5, 5) becomes a weak equilibrium, because each
firm is indifferent between this and posting lower bribes, becoming a loser (with a
payoff of 12.5 in both cases).
5.2.1.2 Psychological payoff equilibrium prediction
We generalize the monetary payoff structure of the setup in (1)-(3), using a linear
specification of utilities with an agent-specific psychological cost parameter, γ,
capturing an agent’s aversion to bribe due to ethical reasons, expressed as a loss
per monetary unit of bribe received by the official. Thus, the three agents’ utility
levels after the end of the auction are given by:
πofficial = F + a ·Qwinner + (1 − γofficial) ·Bwinner (5.4)
πwinner = F + a ·Qwinner − (c+ γwinner) ·Bwinner +R (5.5)
πloser = F + a ·Qwinner (5.6)
Assuming perfect information on the agents’ preferences and symmetry in the
sense that each firm correctly predicts that its rival has a similar attitude to ethics,
the following cases emerge:
1. If a ≥ 1− γofficial , the highest quality project will be chosen by the official
and firms will bid only in qualities, leading to the equilibrium: (Q,B) =
(A, 0) independently of the firms’ preferences.
2. If a < 1 − γofficial , the highest bribe will be preferred by the auctioneer.
In that case, firms will bid with the maximum bribe they can, as long as the
1The corresponding expected payoff matrix for the firms’ bidding subgame is provided in
chapter 2, figure 2.1.
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generalized bribing cost does not exceed the fixed amount R earned by the




Summarizing, the model predicts that officials may choose the highest quality
proposal if they are sufficiently bribery-averse, while they will choose the bidder
with the highest bribe otherwise. In the perfect information setting discussed above,
firms faced with a quality-maximizing auctioneer, will not bid with bribes, inde-
pendently of their own preferences, whereas firms anticipating a bribery-maximizing
behavior by the auctioneer will promise higher bribes, the less bribery-averse they
are. In the case of uncertainty regarding the official’s type, a generalized version of
this model would produce a continuum of equilibrium predictions, depending on
the percentage of pro-social officials and the distribution of bribery-aversion costs.
While the development of a general model with these characteristics is beyond the
scope of this chapter, it is rather straightforward consequence of our setup that the
distribution of officials’ and firms’ bribery-aversion parameters will have the ex-
pected result of less bribery and more pro-social project choices, the higher the
density of bribery-aversion parameters on larger values.
5.2.2 Experimental design
Two treatmens were run, using a within-subject design. Subjects were aware of
the fact that new, supplementary instructions would be given after period 15. Dur-
ing the first 15 periods, the Baseline (T0) treatment was run, corresponding to the
auction described above, played repeatedly by fixed triplets of players, each repres-
enting an economy of two firms and an official. At the beginning of period 16, the
Inspection (T1) treatment was introduced with further instructions and new fixed
roles and matching of players. In T1, after each auction has been resolved by the
auctioneer, the loser can activate the ‘Inspect’ option to reveal a possible bribe.
A revealed bribe leads both players involved to the loss of their period earnings,
whereas, if no bribe is revealed, the denouncing firm loses all its period profits in-
stead. This extreme setup for the inspection and punishment mechanism does not
1These equilibrium bids correspond to the continuous strategy case. With discrete strategies,
equilibrium (Qi, Bi) = (5, 5) disappears for γi > 0, while as γi increases, equilibria
(Qi, Bi) = (8, 2), (Qi, Bi) = (9, 1) and (Qi, Bi) = (10, 0) emerge.
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affect the theoretical equilibrium predictions of the model, given that, in theory,
losers should not use the inspection option because of its negative expected payoff.
Given the lower complexity of T0 compared to T1, we kept the order of the two
conditions fixed to guarantee that subjects’ learning in T0 helped them adapt faster
to the more complex situation in T1. This also helped us to avoid having too few
observations in any of the subcases (like for example no bribe in T0).
5.2.3 Procedures
A total of 93 subjects participated in the experiment following the usual recruit-
ment and ethical clearance protocols used in the LEE at the Universitat Jaume I
(Castellón, Spain).1 Given the technical restrictions associated with the continuous
measurement of skin conductance, each session consisted of small groups of 12 or
9 subjects each.2
5.2.3.1 Behavioral and physiological data collection procedures
The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree toolbox (Fischbacher (2007)).
Continuous electrodermal activity was recorded during the entire experimental
session using a BIOPAC MP150 system and four TEL100C telemetry modules
(BIOPAC systems, Inc). Two Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with isotonic gel were
placed on each subject’s distal phalanges of the middle and the index fingers of the
non-dominant hand. The BIOPAC amplifier applies a constant voltage of 0.5 V
to provide a continuous measure of the skin conductance level between the two
electrodes, as this varies with sweat gland activity. Specifically, activation of the
sympathetic nervous system due to emotional arousal results in marked increases of
the skin conductance level. When evoked by particular experimental events, these
increases in conductance are called skin conductance responses (SCRs) (Dawson
et al. (2007)). The skin conductance signal was sampled at 125 Hz and low-pass
filtered offline at 0.5 Hz using a Butterworth digital filter. SCRs were automatically
1Specifically, 46 male and 47 female undergraduate student-subjects were recruited by means
of the ORSEE software Greiner (2004).
27 sessions of 12 subjects and one of 9 subjects.
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detected and their amplitudes were quantified using a custom version of the Mat-
lab EDA toolbox freely available at: https://github.com/mateusjoffily/EDA. False
SCRs were removed after visual inspection of the entire signal. SCRs were associ-
ated to a specific decision if their onset appeared at least 1.0 s after subjects were
informed about their choices and before the moment of the decision. SCRs were
associated to a feedback event when their onset appeared between 1.0 and 3.0 s
after the display of the feedback screen. Only responses above 0.02 microSiemens
(µS) were considered as valid. Group average SCRs were obtained by averaging
across events of the same condition (e.g. decisions involving bribe) the values at
each time sample. A nonparametric permutations test based on 200 surrogate data
sets, obtained by permutating the data points at each sample from all individual
trials of each subject, was subsequently carried out to detect statistical differences
between conditions. To control for false positive statistical error, the false discovery
rate correction method for multiple comparisons was used.
5.2.3.2 Timing of behavioral events for continuous-time physiological meas-
urements
Physioeconomics is a new interdisciplinary area of research, combining experi-
mental economics and psychophysiology. Both disciplines use computerized solu-
tions to manage stimuli, strategies, feedback and collect the data. The hardware
and software used in our study pose a challenge regarding the need to collect and
interactively communicate the timing of behavioral and physiological events across
the two computer systems. We have used a solution which to the best of our know-
ledge has not been previously used in any physioeconomics study so far. As argued
in Perakakis et al. (2013), it is the most accurate methodology for the synchron-
ized timing of behavioral data and physiological reactions. The main challenge is
how to synchronize, free of undesirable network-related lags, the z-Tree-assisted
strategy submission, information screens and feedback on one hand, with the ac-
curate timing (with 2 millisecond precision) of events necessary for the association
of SCR data to their corresponding stimuli. The method relies on the use of photo-
diodes1, detecting the change across subsequent z-Tree screens, on which a small
1A photodiode is a type of photodetector capable of converting light changes into electric sig-
nals.
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‘black box’ appears on the upper left corner of each odd-number screen.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 The sample
The behavioral results reported here are based on the sample of 93 participants (31
officials and 62 firm-subjects). Following the two random matchings and role as-
signments, in T0 there were 15 male officials and 32 male firm-subjects, whereas
in T1 there were 13 male officials and 34 male firm-subjects.1 Physiological res-
ults are based on a slightly smaller sample of 89 subjects, given that 4 subjects
were excluded due to partly or fully missing information on the recording of their
electrodermal activity.
5.3.2 Behavioral results
Figure 5.1 presents the main patterns observed regarding the behavior of subjects.
As seen on Figure 5.1a, in T0, 81.4% of the decisions by officials are compatible
with monetary reward maximization (excluding ties, in which the distinction is
not meaningful). The remaining decisions (18.6%) are pro-social, corresponding
to the choice of the bid with the highest quality, against the official’s monetary
reward maximization. The pattern is reversed in the presence of an inspection
option. Specifically, in T1, the majority of officials’ choices (54.55%) become
pro-social. Regarding the behavior of firm-subjects in T0, Figure 5.1b shows a
stable pattern of bribe averages slightly below 3 in T0 and a rapidly decreasing
trend of bribes in T1. On average, the inclusion of an inspection option in T1 leads
to a statistically significant (Mann-Whitney z= 15.78, p<0.01) decrease of bribes
from 2.66 to 0.81 monetary units. In fact, as seen on Figure 5.1c, bribe bids in
T1 exhibit a high concentration on 0, which becomes the modal strategy chosen
by firm-subjects in over a 70% of the cases as opposed to slightly above 10% in
1Gender differences were statistically non-significant for behavioral results in T1 and physiolo-
gical responses throughout the study. The only gender differences found in T0 is that women in
the role of firms bribe more (Mann-Whitney z= -2.07, p<0.05) and in the role of officials exhibit a
stronger preference for higher quality bids (χ2=14.43, p<0.01).
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T0. Nevertheless, in T0, subjects’ behavior has remained within the pro-social
range, with almost a fifth of officials’ decisions being compatible with a bribery-
averse parameter of γ > 1/2 and a bribe average slightly below 3, which is the
minimum predicted in the monetary reward-maximizing equilibria. In fact, over
40% of bribe choices are 0, 1 or 2 units. In T1, the introduction of the inspection
option has drastically enhanced pro-social behavior, by both officials and firm-
subjects, especially towards the last periods, in which average bribes fall below 1,
despite the fact that the inspection option has been rarely used (in 87 of 465 or
18.71% of all instances possible) and gradually abandoned by the losers, as shown
on Figure 5.1d, falling from 41.93% (13 out of 31 cases) in period 16 to 6.45% (2
out of 31 cases) in period 30. Interestingly, from all the cases in which an inspection
has been activated (N=87), a 44.83% (N=39) corresponds to losing firm-subjects
who had offered a bribe in the same period, whereas the majority (55.17% of them,
N=48) of inspecting losers had not offered a bribe. In few words, our behavioral
results reveal the presence of intrinsic pro-social motivations, but the presence of
the extrinsic threat posed by the possibility of an inspection is shown to have a
drastic pro-social effect, despite the fact that inspection is only activated in the
minority of cases, rendering the threat ex post efficient, as it enhances pro-social
behavior at a negligible social cost.
5.3.3 Physiological results
From the discussion so far, we have seen that in our setup intrinsic pro-social mo-
tivations co-exist with extrinsic motivations like standard monetary reward max-
imization and the additional threat of punishment for anti-social behavior. Having
created these motivations in the laboratory environment, we are now interested in
the emotions triggered by different stages of the decision-making process, as well
as by the feedback received. Figures 5.2 , 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5, display average SCRs
associated to decisions made by officials and firm-subjects. Specifically, Figure 5.2
shows SCRs related to officials’ project assignment decisions in T0. We compare
the average SCR related to decisions favorable to bribes with those favorable to a
bribe-free bid. We find that decisions deviating from monetary maximization are
associated to higher arousal than those giving the license to bribers as dictated by
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(a) Officials’ decisions (b) Bribe evolution
(c) Bribe distribution (d) Inspection frequency evolution
Figure 5.1: Behavioral results: (a) Officials’ decisions. (b) Bribe evolution. (c)
Bribe distribution. (d) Inspection frequency evolution
monetary reward maximization (significant differences at p<0.05 were found at a
latency range between 6.27 and 7.08 sec post-stimulus). Figure 5.3 shows SCRs
corresponding to the officials’ project assignment decisions in T1. In this case,
decisions opting for the bid with a bribe demonstrate a higher emotional response
(p<0.05 between 11.8 and 12.2 sec). Before interpreting these findings, we turn to
the decisions of firm-subjects. Figure 5.4 compares the average SCRs associated
to decisions made by firms at the moment of posting their bids in T0. Decisions
not to bribe entail an increased emotional arousal compared to those who do bribe
(p<0.01 between 3.57 and 4.71 sec). Finally, Figure 5.5 represents the same de-
cision event in the inspection treatment (T1), where higher arousal is associated
with bribing (p<0.01 between 2.45 and 2.72 sec). Therefore, higher arousal levels
in T0 are not associated with bribe-giving or bribe-taking but, rather, with individu-
ally unprofitable choices. Contrary to T0, in T1, higher arousal levels are associated
with bribery. However, observe that while accepting or offering a bribe in T0 is a
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dominant strategy if we assume that subjects are bribe-neutral and maximize own
monetary payoffs, in T1, bribes entail the risk of a significant monetary loss, ren-
dering anti-social behavior individually unprofitable. Thus, a coherent explanation
of the 4 patterns observed is that higher arousal levels correspond to decisions de-
viating from the objective of maximizing the decision-maker’s monetary reward. It
is interesting to note that such exciting decisions deviate from the majority choice.
In fact, the results obtained for T1 under the threat of being discovered and pun-
ished are in accordance with those obtained by Coricelli et al. (2010) and Coricelli
et al. (2014), indicating that the negative emotions found in those studies were
more likely related with the fear of being discovered to evade than with regret due
to non-compliance with a pro-social norm. Therefore, an alternative way to frame
or complement the aforementioned explanation is that subjects deviating from pure
monetary reward maximization do not only deviate from the strategy dictated by
their own pecuniary interest, but also from the strategy chosen by the majority of
subjects. An important implication of this finding is that, when choosing in the
presence of conflicting motivations, human actions do not equalize (dis)utilities
across the alternatives available to them. Instead, conflicts are reflected on emo-
tions which persist after the decision is made and they are perceived stronger, the
more a given decision deviates from the basic motivation of monetary reward max-
imization. Therefore, skin conductance results show an interesting overall pattern
concerning bribers. They demonstrate higher arousal when they do not bribe in the
baseline treatment and when they do in the inspection one, namely, when they opt
for the least common and potentially least profitable strategy in each case. Bribe-
takers react in a similar manner, indicating that passive bribery carries also a moral
burden.
While the discussion so far concerns emotions triggered by subjects’ decisions,
emotional arousal may also emerge from the anticipation of the consequences of
others’ actions. A rather expected pattern concerns the emotional response obtained
due to the anxiety experienced by the winners while waiting for the loser’s decision
to activate an inspection or not. Figure 5.6 shows that bribing winners waiting for
losers to decide whether to audit them or not exhibit significantly higher emotional
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Figure 5.2: Officials’ SCR following project choice screen (T0).
Figure 5.3: Officials’ SCR following project choice screen (T1).
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Figure 5.4: Firms’ SCR following bid decision screen (T0).
Figure 5.5: Firms’ SCR following bid decision screen (T1).
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arousal compared to honest winners (p<0.05 between 1.8 and 3.4 sec).
Figure 5.6: Winners’ skin-conductance while waiting for loser to decide whether to
order an inspection.
5.3.3.1 Response times
We argue here that emotional arousal emerges from a conflict between monetary
and ethical attractors of behavior. Thus, we would expect ethical decisions dictated
by pro-social incentives to lead to emotional arousal if the corresponding decision
contradicts the basic instinct of selfish monetary reward maximization. Our results
are compatible with this view. First of all, we find a positive and significant correla-
tion (Spearman ρ=0.12, p<0.01) between arousal and response times. To be more
specific, in figures 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 we plot the distribution of response times in the
Inspection treatment per decision type. Recall that in this treatment, the majority
choice was the pro-social one, because of the inspection risk. First, in Figure 5.7 it
is seen that officials decide faster when they choose higher quality projects. Sim-
ilarly, according to Figure 5.8, bribing firms take longer to make their decisions.
Finally, on Figure 5.9 we see that losers take less time to decide not to inspect than
to inspect. In all these cases, the negative expected profit of the anti-social decision
corresponds to higher emotional arousal, as shown by our SCR data. In few words,
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the more subjects do something against their expected monetary interest, the longer
it takes for them to decide, presumably because of conflicting internal motivations.
Thus, in our case, emotional choices can be seen as choices that create con-
flict or internal dissonance that probably needs even more cognitive processing or
reasoning in order to resolve the conflict and make a decision. Rubinstein (2014)
associates longer response times with contemplative decisions, as opposed to in-
stinctive and thus faster ones. In Rubinstein (2007), it was argued that instinctive,
thus emotional, decisions are usually made faster than those resulting from a cog-
nitively demanding processing. So, in accord with Rubinstein and common sense,
more cognitive processing requires more time, although the term instinctive used
in Rubinstein (2007) should not be confused with emotional, which, as we show
here is more likely in the presence of a moral conflict and specifically, when the
decisions made contradict reward maximization.
Figure 5.7: Response time for T1: Bribe vs Quality maximization (officials).
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Figure 5.8: Response time for T1: Bribe vs No Bribe (firms).




Economic decisions are often made in contexts generating conflicting motivations.
Such conflicts have increasingly attracted the attention of economists, psycholo-
gists and decision theorists. Several studies, like Coricelli et al. (2010, 2014) have
shown that selfish economic decisions with a negative public externality may cause
a moral conflict reflected on the decision-maker’s emotional arousal. In fact, both
studies had also obtained subjects’ self-reported emotions, finding that negative
feelings were triggered by non-compliance with a pro-social norm. However, in
both of these papers, non-compliance occured in the presence of a threat of punish-
ment through publicity of the photos of subjects engaging in tax evasion. There-
fore, any intrinsic aversion to tax evasion or regret for it co-existed with extrinsic
threats against anti-social behavior. In this chapter, in the context of a public pro-
curement auction with a bribe possibility and punishment options, we find that it
is not the violation or compliance with a given ethical norm per se which trig-
gers the emotional arousal, but rather the actual decision to act against one’s own
monetary interest. Complementing our SCR data with response times, we estab-
lish that decisions which may or may not be pro-social may cause an increased
emotional arousal, as long as they deviate from the objective of monetary reward
maximization. From a methodological point of view, our results suggest that, so far,
emotional arousal may have been wrongly associated only with unethical behavior,
because it may have been triggered by an ethical decision against the decision-
maker’s selfish motivation. However, emotional arousal is a reliable marker to
detect a subject’s anxiety due to unethical behavior, while waiting for inspection
and punishment by another person.
Future research should pursue obtaining more evidence on the correlation between
response times and physiological manifestations of emotions. The extent to which
the former can be used as a proxy of the other is of great interest to behavioral
economists. Furthermore, more evidence is needed in order to establish the share
of fear of being punished in the negative emotions associated with the violation of
a pro-social norm.
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5.5 Appendix: Instructions to experimental subjects
(translated from Spanish)
Welcome and thanks for your participation in this experiment. Please switch off
your mobile phones and secure your belongings away. You are going to participate
in an experimental session split into two subsessions of 15 rounds each. You will
earn an amount of money which will depend on your decisions and the decisions of
other participants in the session. From this moment onwards you must use only the
instructions and the computer in front of you. If you have any questions through-
out the session, please raise your hand and you will receive an answer by one of
the experimentalists. Any communication with other participants will imply your
immediate exclusion from the experiment.
5.5.1 [T0]
At the beginning of this subsession, you will be assigned one of two roles: ‘a firm’
or ‘an official’. Your role is randomly assigned to you and remains fixed throughout
the subsession. You will be anonymously and randomly assigned to a group of
three players: two firms and an official. The group will be fixed throughout the
subsession. Rounds are independent, in the sense that the payoff consequences of
decisions made in any round do not carry over to subsequent rounds. Once this
part is finished, the experimentalist will give you new instructions for the second
subsession.
• Decision Making
In each round, all players receive an endowment of 10 ExCU1.
If you are a firm: You compete with the other firm of your group for the license
of a public project whose quality is beneficial to all players in the group. In each
round, you have to post bids on the quality of your project and a monetary transfer
which you wish to send privately to the official in your group if you are chosen
to undertake the project. Firms’ bids are made simultaneously, so that each firm
can only know its own bids, but not the bids of the other firm. The quality and
1Experimental Currency Unit.
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the transfer to the official must sum 10, so that if your quality bid is 9 your trans-
fer to the official in case you win will be 1. If you win the auction, apart from
your round endowment, you earn a fixed extra profit. In that case, you also have to
spend on the transfer to the official double the amount you promised in your bid.
If you lose the auction, apart from your initial endowment from each round, your
earnings include a profit which is proportional to the quality of the winning project.
If you are an official: In each round, you receive the bids from the firms in your
group. Then, you have to choose one of the two projects. Apart from your initial
endowment in this round, your earnings include a profit which is proportional to the
winner’s quality plus the amount, if any, privately transferred to you by the winner.
• Exact calculation of profits
From the description of strategies and earnings above, the specific formulas
used to calculate your profits in each round (π) are a function of the quality (Q)
and transfer (B) bids of the winner, as shown below:
πwinner = 10 +
1
2
·Qwinner + 10 − 2 ·Bwinner









If you are a firm: At the end of each round, you will receive information on
which firm won the license, a reminder of your decisions on quality level and trans-
fer in that round, as well as your profit for that round.
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If you are an official: In each round, after firms have made their decisions, their
quality and transfer bids will be displayed on your screen before you make a de-
cision. Once you select the winning firm, you will receive information on your
profits in this round.
• Monetary rewards
In order to determine your payment in this subsession, the computer will ran-
domly choose one of the 15 rounds at the end of the session. The amount of money
you will earn from this part of the experiment will be equal to your profits in the




In this subsession, the context will be exactly the same as in the first one, except
for the following:
The roles of subjects and the composition of groups will be re-determined ran-
domly and will remain fixed throughout the remaining rounds of the session.
A new feature is that, in each round, after the winner of the auction has been
determined by the official, the loser firm has the option to ask for an inspection of
the winning bid. The decision to inspect modifies the subjects’ earnings as follows:
If a transfer has taken place, the official and the winner of the auction earn nothing
in this round. On the contrary, if no transfer is revealed, then, the inspecting loser
earns nothing in this round. Finally, if no inspection is activated, players’ earnings
remain unchanged.
• Monetary rewards
In order to determine your payment in this subsession, the computer will ran-
domly choose one of the 15 rounds at the end of the session. The amount of money
you will earn from this part of the experiment will be equal to your profits in the
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Fehr, E. and Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature,
425:137–140. 46
Fehr, E. and Schneider, F. (2010). Eyes are on us, but nobody cares: Are eye cues
relevant for strong reciprocity? Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences, 277(1686):1315–23. 49
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experi-
ments. Experimental Economics, 10(2):171–178. 19, 84
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N., and Sefton, M. (1994). Fairness in simple
bargaining experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 6(3):347–369. 48
Frank, B., Lambsdorff, J. G., and Mohnen, P. (2010). Gender and corruption: Les-
sons from laboratory corruption experiments. European Journal of Development
Research, 23(1):59–71. 15, 44, 67
Frank, B. and Schulze, G. G. (2000). Does economics make citizens corrupt?
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 43(1):101–113. 14, 15, 44, 78
Gneezy, U., Saccardo, S., and Veldhuizen, R. V. (2013). Bribery: Greed versus
reciprocity. Mimeo San Diego, pages 1–27. 79
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